Equality

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It is widely believed in mainstream circles that equality between human beings, in one form or another, is some kind of virtue to which society ought to aspire and that rank inequality is a measure of severe injustice that needs to be corrected by state action. Equality between individuals has also been used as a primary weapon against those who favour capitalism and free exchange. Even though the worst excesses of inequality – such as the rising value of assets owned by the rich as a result of worldwide money printing – are in fact, products of a state corporatist system, it is true that proponents of the free market favour a system in which some people will be wealthier by virtue of their ownership of a greater number of resources than other people.

Our critique of equality here will be somewhat different from the usual free market or libertarian approaches towards tackling this issue, which normally explain the virtues of the free market and the ethics of private property and how these are better than striving for some kind of equality. Although we will certainly champion these arguments, our approach will be two-pronged. First of all, we will conclude that the aspiration towards some kind of perfect or immediate equality – i.e. the forced attempt to render all people absolutely equal now with today’s stock of wealth and resources – is undesirable, impractical and far from being a moral virtue. However, more importantly, we will go on to argue that, if someone desires a more approximate or gradual achievement of equality – such as the so-called “equality of opportunity” – statism, socialism and any kind of redistributionism must be abandoned and that those who seek to create such equality must instead embrace a social order that maximises the production of wealth. That social order is, of course, free market capitalism.

Perfect Equality

Our starting point in examining the advocacy for some kind of perfect or immediate equality is to acknowledge that nature places a formidable number of obstacles in the way of achieving such equality. One of these barriers is the fact of human action itself – the ability of each individual human to think, desire and consciously choose to devote the resources at his disposal in ways that he deems fit. In other words individual humans make decisions to act independently of one another. Some of these decisions will be good or better decisions while others will be bad or worse. Some people will make a greater number of bad or worse decisions than good or better decisions while others will make a greater number of good or better decisions than they do bad or worse decisions. The varying results of these decisions serve to place people in a state of inequality, with those that make good or better decisions ending up in a better condition than those who make bad or worse decisions. Any attempt to subvert these outcomes and to create, instead, a greater degree of equality between humans would subordinate all individually motivated behaviour to the directions of the state, lest anyone was to act in such a way as to put himself in a position better than that of his fellow human. Although this would be undeniably totalitarian and despotic the more crucial point is that any such drive towards equality would require a complete annihilation of the preeminent quality of human nature – that of rational action. It would render us all as nothing better than automated robots, unable to act upon our own feelings and desires while under the control of our political lords and masters. Hence, unless anybody is happy to become an unthinking cog in a society that represents mere machinery then we must conclude that equality is an inherently undesirable goal.

This formidable obstacle placed in the way of equality by nature – the fact that we think, choose, desire as individuals – renders perfect equality not only undesirable but also impractical. Let us say that even if we were able to stifle all individual human action and create a perfect material equality between every human being. It would still be the case, however, that individual people would value these possessions differently. A white stick, for instance, is likely to be very valuable to a blind man yet next to useless to a sighted man. If you give both of these men a white stick it is clear that, even though their physical, material possessions are identical, one has gained value more than another. Thus, if we have to strive for perfect equality it is useless to attempt to distribute resources equally, lest someone ends up more happy and content with the same possessions than somebody else and thus rendering them in unequal conditions. Perhaps such a problem could be resolved by simply giving them an equal amount of money? Wouldn’t everyone then be able to spend their equal amount of money on different things that are valuable to them? Unfortunately this would not work either because one person may need to spend more money to gain the same amount of satisfaction as another person. People who are more satisfied with spiritual and non-material needs may be content with spending very little of the money allocated to them whereas those who are materialistic and seek value in possessions may require a lot more for them to feel as happy as the non-materialistic folk. What the budding egalitarian would have to do, therefore, is to attempt to provide for each person’s needs regardless of the precise quantity of goods required for those needs. So in other words one person may receive a lot whereas another person would receive very little if they are both made equally satisfied by what they receive. This, however, turns the whole of economics on its head. Economising behaviour regulates needs to the goods available. Needs are insatiable whereas goods are scarce and we must choose which of our needs we value the most in order to allocate the goods available to them. There is not a fixed number of needs or a fixed quantity of happiness shared between all people which can be satisfied by an abundant stock of goods. Needs are also intangible entities, existing in only the mind. They cannot be measured with any yardstick and any attempt to do so would simply subordinate the real value of the needs as perceived by individual people to their value as perceived by some bureaucrat – and, of course, this bureaucrat will have his own motivations for determining who gets what. One’s own value of one’s needs is subordinated to the value of those needs as perceived by the state. Anyone who has needs deemed unworthy by the state, perhaps because they are “unpatriotic” or somehow not in keeping with the spirit of the “the people”, will be left far worse off than those who toe the state’s line, which is how redistributionist policy always works in practice.

If we look more broadly at the entirety of the natural state of human beings, things do not get much better for the budding egalitarian. Indeed so inherent is the natural state of inequality between human beings that we could even suggest that Mother Nature intended it to be so and that she willed such a state to be permanent. Individual people are born with different qualities – different heights, different weights, different physical and mental capabilities, and so on. So too are the environments into which they are born different. Not only will their parents and those around them also have varying characteristics and varying abilities at raising their offspring, but the precise climate, geography and availability of natural resources will differ from place to place. Hence, the Earth itself gifts different people differently and presents them with different degrees of challenge for them to live their lives. Some of these environmental differences are likely to have had a cumulative genetic impact as a result of natural selection that exacerbates further inequalities. A society which has developed in an area where resources are plentiful and where little work needs to be done to ensure survival will have had its physical and mental capabilities tested to a much lower degree than a society that has developed in a barren area where resources are scarce and what little the earth has to offer must be obtained through ingenuity and backbreaking physical work. Only the most intelligent and strongest will have survived and prospered in the latter society whereas practically anyone could have lived in the former society. After generations of reproduction, therefore, those who are born today in the latter society – the “difficult” one – are likely to have superior mental and physical attributes that are not enjoyed by those in the “easy” society. Ironically, therefore, those who descended from a society which originally had “less” are those who are likely to command greater wealth and income, by virtue of their superior strength and intellect, in today’s society characterised by global trade and the division of labour. Indeed, given that we have mentioned trade and the division of labour, we might as well point out that any drive towards an immediate and perfect equality would require the complete eradication of these elements for they are clearly founded on a rank inequality. The division of labour cannot exist unless people utilise different skills and different abilities to undertake different tasks. If two people wish to trade it is because they each start off with different things and each wish to obtain different things through the trade. In other words each partner to the exchange desires to be different and views himself as having gained something more than what he parted with.

The fact of all these inequalities alone does not, of course, prevent equality from being a virtue. Simply because something is does not been that it ought to be. However, the manifold extent of inequality that has been presented to us by nature indicates that, in order to reverse such a natural state, a considerable and extensive power of man over nature will be required. It is here where the notion of equality as an argument for some kind of socialism or redistributionism collapses. Creating a condition of equality will not require, as is typically supposed, a redistribution of existing wealth – that is, man’s existing power over nature – but, rather, the generation of more wealth in order to overcome the formidable barriers to equality that nature has put in our path. Those who desire equality should, in fact, not be dreaming up ways in which to rob the rich to give to the poor but, rather, should be finding the best possible way to ensure wealth creation. As we shall explore now it is in fact a society of private property and free exchange – i.e. of capitalism – which, by virtue of its superior productive ability, accomplishes this and which makes a tendency towards greater equality more likely.

The Equalising Tendencies of Capitalism

While we examine the equalising tendencies of capitalism, we must admit, lest w be accused of creating a straw man, that equality is not usually advocated in any perfect or absolute sense in the manner that we just subjected to criticism. Egalitarians do not typically strive for the complete eradication of all differences and idiosyncrasies between humans, even if social systems founded upon equality have tried to decimate all independent and unapproved opinions, culture, tastes, and personal habits. The staunchest of such egalitarians will still admit that the division of labour – upon which human prosperity depends – requires some people to be garbage collectors and others to be brain surgeons, for example, and that it would be a travesty for everybody to be garbage collectors or for everybody to practise brain surgery. Rather, the egalitarian strives for some kind of approximate equality. After all, approximate equality could be achieved so long as everybody is doing the job that he most enjoys and/or is best at, and surely people having some kind of access to roughly the same amount of wealth would be better than nothing at all? To implement such a programme through a socialist society would, however, produce the very opposite of equality. In a society governed by private property and free exchange, the ownership of all of the material wealth in existence is scattered between all of the private individuals who inhabit the Earth. As all persons are free to make their own decisions as to how best to deploy their wealth it is true that some people will have accumulated more while others will have accumulated less. However, those who accumulate more do so because they serve the needs of consumers better than anyone else – consumers entrust these resources to these particular people because the latter have, so far, proven themselves better at directing them to the most urgent wants of the consumers than anyone else. The wealthy in a capitalist society cannot abuse their position as their fortunes would soon begin to haemorrhage. Rather, they must continue to serve the needs of consumers better than anyone else, or consumers will drop them and their products in a flash while the productive assets that form their wealth will be transferred to other people. There also seems to be something of a limit on how much of societal wealth any individual can command in such a society. As of 2016 the wealthiest man in the world, Bill Gates, has a total fortune of $81.7 billion – a drop in the ocean compared to the $3.7 trillion budget of the federal government last year, and peanuts compared to the sums that central bankers like to print from thin air. Warren Buffett, widely regarded as the most successful investor in history, has admitted that achieving a significant annual return for his firm Berkshire Hathaway is now much more difficult than it used to be on account of the size that the firm has now achieved. It is typically believed that capitalism has a tendency towards monopoly, with more and more wealth being sucked into the clutches of a few powerful oligarchs. The opposite is in fact the case – one individual entrepreneur or investor can only direct his attention to so much before his talents are spread too thinly, or he has to delegate to lesser individuals. Hence, inefficiencies begin to creep in which provide an advantage to smaller, more nimble competitors and thus checking the growth of any established player. In a socialist society, however, matters are completely different. If you deprive all of the individual citizens of their ability to direct their labour and their resources to the employments that they feel are best then these decisions have to be made by somebody else. There must be someone who has de facto ownership and control over resources in order for these resources to be directed. These people are, of course, those who form the state and its planning bureaucracy. Clearly this amounts to an enormous concentration of wealth in the hands of a very small, political elite, a concentration which by far exceeds that of the wealthiest individual in a capitalist society. These elites will direct resources according to what they value rather than what is valuable for everyone else. Not only will you get parades of missiles accompanied by goose stepping troops, and the construction of vanity projects such as the unfinished 105 storey hotel in Pyongyang, but even if the direction of resources is for the benefit of other people this light will be refracted through the prism of the elites’ own preoccupations. If the minister of a particular socialist state or department thinks single mothers are hard done by then single mothers will get more; if he is an ex-railway worker then he is likely to account for the condition of railway workers more than someone who has no such background; if a relative of his died from cancer then he is likely to want to devote more resources to cancer research than someone who has had no such exposure, while those suffering from other illnesses and conditions must put up with lesser treatment. And, of course, he will have every incentive to direct wealth to personal favourites and political supporters that serve to keep him in his powerful position. No longer is his status and privilege determined by serving consumers who can choke off his supply of funds at any point they desire. Rather, he now depends upon currying favour with his political contemporaries. Furthermore, if he is able to maintain such favour he can simply resort, when directing resources to where he wants, to the use of force rather than the use of persuasion through offering a valuable service. Socialism does not eliminate any unequal, societal statuses; it simply changes the game of who rises to the top – and when you are at the top you are more unequal from the rest of society than in a capitalist economy. Moreover, socialism cements these statuses from a revolving membership determined by who best can serve consumers into semi-permanent and impenetrable political castes. All of this can be illustrated today in some of the so-called democratic socialist countries such as Venezuela, where the daughter of the late, former President Hugo Chavez enjoys a personal fortune of approximately $4.2 billion, while the country’s socialist policies have made basic necessities so scarce that the black market price for a dozen eggs have reportedly reached $150. According to The Daily Mail, at the Caracas Country Club the nation’s super rich socialists “enjoy lavish parties and gourmet cuisine, while middle-class people are forced to scavenge for food” at a membership cost of 458 times the average Venezuelan salary. The attitude of the elites is almost literally the modern day equivalent of Nero fiddling – “Should we stop enjoying ourselves just because the country is burning?” one is quoted as saying. Far from being a creator of any kind of approximate equality, socialism widens the gulf between rich and poor immeasurably, and to the extent that people are equal at all they languish in equal destitution.

Of course, after the twentieth century failures of communism and socialism, the aims of the equalisers and egalitarians have been watered down further into vaguer nuances such as the so-called “equality of opportunity” – i.e. that everyone may become richer and may become better off than other people as a result of their own talents and hard work so long as they all start off from the same supposed springboard. The idea is, in other words, that if an individual is born to wealthy parents resulting in a high quality of education and a comfortable upbringing he has a “head start” against someone from a poorer background who does not have these benefits, and that it is this kind of inequality that should be eradicated through redistribution. In the first place, any kind of birth into wealth and affluence does not by itself guarantee that the individual will have any talent or affinity for hard work. Indeed, the opposite is likely to be the case if he knows that, in order with stave off any hardship he encounters, Daddy will simply whip out his cheque book. Somebody who is less privileged, however, who has no alternative but to use his natural abilities and dedication to get ahead is more likely to do so. It is for this reason that most of the significant entrepreneurs and inventors were drop outs and rebels against the formal system of education and progression. The traditional path through school and elite university really only prepares one for a career in the establishment professions such as law, banking and the civil service – occupations which make you well off largely because the state ensures that your wealth is perpetuated. However, if we accept the premise that equality of opportunity through providing equal resources to the young will benefit the latter then it would not follow that the best manner to achieve this would be through redistribution. Rather, it would be better to follow a path of wealth creation so that the poorest in society are able to afford a high quality education – and an education of higher quality than the rich may have enjoyed in the recent past – sooner. The reason for this is that it is not the relative difference between rich and poor that is the significant factor – rather, it is whether the poor have enough to put them in a position in which they can compete effectively. While it is true that, in a capitalist society, the rich will get richer as the poor get richer and thus the rich will always be able to afford “more” than the poor, there is only a finite amount that they can spend productively on, say, educating themselves highly and sharpening their talents for entrepreneurship before any additional resources in this direction will produce diminishing returns. For example, a person can only read so many books in a day; if a rich person spends more on books he will not become more educated than a poorer person if he never has time to read those books. So if wealth creation results in the poor being able to afford as many books as the rich can read then both rich and poor will be equally well read. The rich may be able to afford more tutors than the poor, but they can only absorb so much information from so many tutors before all these mentors will drown themselves out in a cacophony of confusion. Therefore, if wealth creation permits the poor to afford as many tutors as the rich can absorb information from then both rich and poor will be equally well tutored. It is still true, of course, that the rich will spend more on educating themselves than the poor and it is also true that the rich will be the first to benefit from any innovations. However, as the poor get wealthier, this additional money spent by the rich tends to go towards additional pleasantries and luxuries rather than the substantial necessities of learning – for example, the classrooms may be nicer, the chairs comfier, the writing paper of a higher quality. But none of these things really matter a great deal when it comes to absorbing knowledge – or rather they matter far less than the poor being unable to afford any education at all. It is for this reason that wealth creation, through free market capitalism, rather than wealth distribution, produces a tendency towards equality and more adequately and permanently closes the gap between rich and poor, both in a very real sense but also in the sense of providing an “equality of opportunity”.

We can illustrate this further through examples in the wider economy. As Mises points out, when the automobile was first invented and only the rich could afford to purchase one, the gap between rich and poor was very wide. The rich had personal, motorised transportation while the poor had to go barefoot, put up with animal powered transport, or use the railway. Once, however, society became wealthy enough to mass produce cars that were affordable by the poor, both rich and poor now had access to motorised transportation. It is true that the rich spend more of their money on their cars than the poor do – and often a lot more. However, most of this additional money is spent on luxury additions such as higher quality paint and body work, sleeker aesthetics, leather upholstery and the fineness of the engine; the basic purpose of the car, to transport a person from A to B, is available to everybody and no amount of additional spending by the rich on their own cars can change this. This was not so before the poor could afford any car at all. Thus the gap between rich and poor has been narrowed through wealth creation. Similarly, the difference between a two bedroom terraced house and an enormous mansion is less than the difference between a house and no house at all; the difference between a gold plated toilet and a ceramic toilet is less than the difference between a toilet and no toilet. If a “poor” individual possesses a genuine talent his inability to afford champagne and caviar rather than bread and cheese is unlikely to prejudice his efforts to capitalise on this talent; but clearly he would be very disadvantaged if he could not afford food at all. What the rich spend on themselves goes towards luxuries and comforts which, while delightful, do not provide any significant material advantage to insulate themselves from a poorer person who can still afford the basics – and of course, the process of wealth creation soon places these luxuries in the hands of the poor anyway. Indeed, the rich, although they consume more goods and services than the poor, consume a lower percentage of their income than the latter do simply because more of their most urgent wants have been satisfied and additional consumption brings fewer and fewer benefits. The remainder of their resources therefore goes into investment or philanthropy – indeed, a wealthy society is awash with charitable giving simply because people have so much more to give. It is true, of course, that a poorer individual may have to demonstrate his talent if he is to persuade other people to fund him in his ventures, whereas a richer person could easily self-fund from his fortune. This, however, is arguably not a disadvantage. When you are risking other people’s money you have to rise to their standards and ensure that the decisions you are making are absolutely the right ones, decisions in which they will take a keen interest. Thus the talents and efforts of a poorer person are enhanced and focussed when he has to use other people’s money. Devoid of third party scrutiny, however, a rich individual, if he does not merely pursue his own flights of fancy without any check upon the hubris of his deluded conviction, is likely at the very least to be more slovenly and less disciplined in his approach. And in any case, if a poorer individual is genuinely talented then what is wrong with expecting him to establish this fact before others?

What we can see therefore is that any drive towards “approximate” equality or some kind of “equality of opportunity” is delivered not by a system of wealth redistribution but by a system of wealth creation. The only system that produces wealth creation, or at least produces it to its strongest possible degree, is a system of free market capitalism.

We might as well conclude with a final observation which is that people seem to be highly selective when it comes to advocating equality through wealth distribution. Apart from the occasional grumble it seems to be perfectly OK for elite sportsmen and women and movie starts to earn large amounts of money. Football enthusiasts in the UK are happy to wax lyrical about how many millions such-and-such a player is being “bought” for by a particular club, or how much one of them earns in a week, fully accepting the essence of the market and voluntary exchange in this arena. When it comes to the CEOs of multinational companies worth billions of dollars, however, it is always a different story – they are greedy fat cats, profiting off the work done by their underlings in the factories and production lines. This is so even though the multinational company may provide “essential” benefits to people such as food to eat and homes to live in, whereas the achievements of even the greatest athlete basically boil down to providing entertainment. The reason for this, of course, is that sporting and acting achievements are readily perceived by the individual, whereas the benefits of entrepreneurship and the stewardship of productive assets are not. If the cries for equality are to be consistent this should not really matter, of course – it should permeate all areas of human endeavour. However, if the ready perception of a wealthy person’s achievement is enough to justify it in the eyes of everybody else then clearly libertarians and free market enthusiasts should continue to extol the benefits of entrepreneurship and attempt elevate, to the level of sportsmanship and acting in front of a camera, the status of businessmen, investors and capitalists who provide goods and services which people want to buy at prices they can afford. This may be the surest way to purge mindless egalitarianism from mainstream social thought.


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Libertarianism, Morality and Religion

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A current recurring debate within the libertarian movement is that between so-called “thin” and “thick” libertarianism, the belief that libertarianism concerns only self-ownership and private property (or at least their derivative non-aggression) on the one hand (“thin”) or whether there are certain other moral imperatives or ends that are, at the very least, part of the libertarian spirit and serve to strengthen its message or, at most, are necessary for its cause (“thick”). In providing a contribution to this debate it is important to understand the place of libertarianism within two things; first, within the wider category of moral philosophy; and second, within the place of the personal ethics of individual libertarians.

Libertarianism and Moral Philosophy

Addressing the first question, it will be argued here that any concept of “thick” libertarianism misunderstands the fact that the purpose of libertarianism is not to espouse a positive theory of interpersonal morality; rather it is to preserve the character of individuals as moral agents to ensure that such theories are possible in the first place.

Questions of morality arise because humans face the constant and ceaseless condition of scarcity. Humans must prioritise the ends that they seek to fulfil as they lack sufficient means with which to satisfy all of them together. Moral considerations arise to inform this prioritisation and would be absent if it was not necessary. If every fulfilment could be achieved without the need of choice then morality would serve no purpose as every possible end would instantaneously be gratified. The necessity of choice, however, requires a means for informing that choice, a way to determine the best outcome that can be achieved with the means available. The result of any choice is an action that has a real physical effect upon the condition of the means, the matter which is the object of the action. A part of the universe is changed physically from serving one end to serving another.

We can think of morality as consisting of two parts or categories. The first part is unilateral or intra-personal and arises where you have a single, desiring, choosing and acting human surrounded only by dead and unconscious matter. Any choice that the human makes will result in an action that will have a physical effect upon at least part of this unconscious matter, for example an apple that is eaten or a piece of wood that is used for a fire or to build a house. Morality, in this instance, will inform the acting human how he should best serve his ends with the means available but there is no reciprocal relationship that arises between the human and the matter around him. Possessing no desire, choice, or action of their own and with their entire condition and motion subject solely to the laws of physics and chemistry, these external entities cannot be described as moral agents and are owed no moral obligation, nor do they possess any moral rights. Moral imperatives may serve to create boundaries upon that which you may do with a certain piece of unconscious matter, but this will entail no reciprocal moral burdens and benefits vis-à-vis that matter1. The second part of morality is bilateral or inter-personal and arises between two or many desiring, choosing and acting beings, all of whom may run into conflicts of scarcity as they seek to fulfil their individually valued ends with the means available, including their own bodies. Not only is someone else’s body inhabited by a conscious and end-seeking being, but the dead and unconscious matter around us may now also be claimed by someone else in order to fulfil that person’s ends and not ours. Hence we have moral rights and obligations that spring up between the acting beings in order to avoid or otherwise resolve these conflicts. There are two sub-divisions to this morality. First is the realm of physical enforcement of moral ends – what we might call violent enforcement. One human being may bring about his end by subjecting another to force or violence. The result of this is that one human’s ends are gained at the expense of another’s. This subdivision is the primary preoccupation of political philosophy – which moral norms may be enforced physically and what are the boundaries of that enforcement? The second sub-division is the realm of non-physical or non-violent enforcement of moral ends – those norms that may only be enforced by persuasion, cajoling, association or non-association, and so on. Furthermore, morality is used to serve as a benchmark or a standard of judgment of moral beings. We apply certain moral codes to other people’s behaviour in order to judge whether they have behaved morally or are, indeed, good and moral persons or evil scoundrels. This straddles both of the categories of morality we just outlined – we make judgments of people’s behaviour both in regard to unconscious matter (i.e. what they might do when alone, in their own home etc.) and of their behaviour towards other people. We may then modify our own behaviour in response to what we see in them – either embracing or befriending them if they are morally good or otherwise attempting to enforce our moral code if we believe them to be morally bad.

Libertarianism, thinly conceived, perfectly preserves these categories in order to provide a foundation for wider moral theory. The critical aspect of all moral agency is that an individual moral being retains the freedom to choose and to act upon his choice. Any physical restraint results in that person not being able to bring about his chosen ends, and any action of his that is compelled by force is not one that he has chosen. In other words the individual would cease to remain as a moral being at all. Libertarianism places only the rights to self-ownership and private property over unconscious matter that is previously unowned (or voluntarily transferred) within the realm of violently enforced inter-personal morality. Any person may repel any invasion of his body or property physically in order to preserve his character as a moral agent. Libertarianism’s sole preoccupation with this fact ensures that this bedrock is firmly established so that we can then go on to develop further theories of intrapersonal and interpersonal morality, to make prescriptions about people should behave, and to make judgments about the behaviour that they do make.

Let us consider, as an example, a proposition of interpersonal morality – that a person should give some of his earnings to the poor. A libertarian would state that this moral proposition would not be violently enforceable and the person would have to choose to donate his money. Such a moral proposition only makes sense when you apply the libertarian foundation of self-ownership and private property, preserving the individual’s character as a moral agent. The proposition concerns how the individual should freely choose to behave in relation to others, and having so behaved we can then make judgments about his moral character. If, on the other hand, it is proposed that the person should be forced to donate his earnings to the poor then this proposition ceases to concern the choice of the individual at all. By enforcing the imperative violently the individual ceases to have any input into the action and is treated simply like a piece of dead matter, such as a hammer or plank of wood – an unconscious tool for the furtherance of other people’s ends. However, the subtle intellectual change that has occurred is that the proposition is no longer a proposition of interpersonal morality. It is, rather, a proposition of intrapersonal morality directed at the enforcing agent, such as the tax collector or bureaucrat. It is not in any way instructing the taxed individual how to behave at all; rather it is instructing his enforcer to take money from him and do X, Y or Z with it. We cannot in any way judge the behaviour of the taxed individual as being “moral” or “immoral”; having no participation in the decision we cannot say that he is a better or worse being as a result. The only person we can judge is the enforcer and whether he behaved morally or immorally by taking the money. What we realise therefore is that any theory of interpersonal morality that enforces its decrees by violence is not a theory of interpersonal theory in any way at all. It simply a theory of intrapersonal morality for the rulers, concerning only how those in positions of power should act unilaterally, treating all other human beings as dead, unconscious tools to be exploited for whatever ends the theory sees fit. Such a theory can never be a theory of society; it preserves only the moral agency of the leader or the controller, degrading all other humans to the level of expendable resources.  Indeed, many moral propositions in public and political discourse today are not directed at the individuals in society but are, rather, are directed at government: “Government should do more to help the poor; government should build more houses; government should do more to curb fossil fuel use; government should provide a better education for my children, etc.” Only the rulers are required to make moral decisions and moral choices while the rest of us are reduced to the level of pets, to be worked, fed and watered but otherwise absolved from any responsibility for what we do. Moreover none of this changes simply because the rulers are democratically elected or, from time to time, the previous minority becomes the majority and the previous rulers may switch places with some of the previously ruled. It simply means that the propositions are directed at functional positions (Prime Minister, President, Congressman, etc.) rather than at specific, unchanging individuals.

It should be equally clear that nothing about such theories relying on force and the propositions that derive from them can make a more “moral” or “good” society for we can only judge a person’s behaviour when he is free to act. When he is forced to act or to not act then we can make no moral judgment of his action whatsoever, just as we cannot say whether a tree is behaving morally or immorally when it shakes in the wind. Indeed, as history has demonstrated amply, the more likely result is a moral degradation of the populace – laziness and lack of motivation caused by the bitterness and resentment at being forced to achieve someone else’s ends, and corruption and black marketing when there are any attempts to circumvent them.

It is this crucial recognition that libertarianism, thinly conceived, has to offer, and why it is becoming so attractive as the failure of government and forced rule becomes more obvious each and every day. Thin libertarianism may have nothing to say whatsoever on any positive moral and political theories. Rather, when those theories advocate violent enforcement, libertarianism, in effect, says “Stop!” Slow down, back track, and understand that for any coherent theory of interpersonal morality you need to preserve self-ownership and private property. Given that this recognition is so desperately lacking, any positive ends that are built upon libertarianism as a superstructure through any “thickening” of its concept is likely to distract from its vital core. In the short term this is likely to dilute the distinction between libertarianism and all other political theories (whether they be conservative or progressive) that has made it so successful – possibly leading to the subsuming of libertarianism as a branch of those political traditions. In the long term, there is the danger that any moral superstructure that is built on top of the foundation of non-aggression will come to jettison the crucial foundation itself. This is arguably what happened to classical liberalism, resulting in its transformation into the statist liberalism we know today2. However, our argument here does not simply concern strategy – that which is necessary for preserving libertarianism, or that which may be best in persuading people of the virtues of a free society and attracting them to the libertarian cause. Rather, the recognition of the preservation of individuals’ moral agency before any further positive, interpersonal moral theory is developed is absolutely essential for conceptual clarity and libertarianism’s place as the bedrock of interpersonal moral theory is required intellectually and not just practically.

We might also point out that there appear to be no positive ends and values that flow self-evidently from self-ownership and private property, or from their derivative, the non-aggression principle. Rather, any such ends and values that are advanced by the individual “thick” libertarian tend to concern that individual’s own personal philosophical preoccupations, such individuals including those with very strong libertarian and scholarly credentials3. It is difficult to see how such varying ends and values flow self-evidently from the same principle. More likely the individual “thickest” identifies the state as the roadblock towards the achievement of his own personal, societal ideals and so he advocates freedom. But he then makes the mistaken leap of tying those ideals – that which he wishes to accomplish through freedom – to freedom itself. We do not mean to suggest, of course, that there is no purpose or importance in debating which values and ends are likely to prevail in a free society, or over those which may assist the libertarian cause (as we shall proceed to do below). But such a debate has nothing per se to do with libertarianism’s place in the sphere of moral and political theory.

Libertarianism and Personal Morality

Addressing now the second aspect of libertarianism – that of its place within the moral outlook of the individual libertarian – it is sufficient, for a person in his capacity as a libertarian, to recognise only private property and self-ownership and to not develop any further moral superstructure upon those foundations. But in his capacity as a human being who must take his place in society we have to stress that such a limitation is woefully inadequate. Libertarianism only states that each and every person should be able to act free from physical incursion. It does not go on to say how he should choose to act, which decisions he should make in allocating the scarce means at his disposal. The consistent libertarian who claimed that self-ownership and private property are the only moral considerations would, in fact, never act at all as he would possess no ends to strive for and no values of which he would seek fulfilment. Rather we all as human beings have values, choices that we believe are right and choices that we believe are wrong, and we all seek to make the right choices and criticise those who do not. Libertarians can probably be forgiven for not having, thus far, emphasised their personal moral theories alongside their libertarian credentials. The violence and destruction wrought by the state has given us plenty to concentrate on. Nevertheless, such a development and espousal of a personal moral theory is critical from both a strategic as well as an intellectual point of view. Not only is it possible for someone who abides strictly by the non-aggression principle to be a thoroughly rotten and unpleasant individual, but the greatest danger lies in the fact that libertarians, by refusing to interfere violently in certain peaceful but morally repugnant ends, may be misinterpreted as going further and actively condoning and praising such behaviour. Simply because we collectively, in our capacity as libertarians, have nothing to say about non-violent actions and choices may result in us appearing as the “anything goes” crowd, failing to address the genuine and heartfelt moral concerns of people we hope to persuade of the virtues of a free society. It is often not sufficient for people to hear that loose abstractions such as “the market” or “private charity” will, for example, suffice to take care of the poor, even if we demonstrate their superiority in doing so. Rather, with any moral issue we are presented, we must be prepared to take a personal moral stance. Our only difference is that we would not violently enforce that stance but would, rather, seek to promote it non-violently and to persuade people to make what we think would be the right choice. It is, therefore, perfectly commendable to state, for example, that people should not be forced to give to the poor but that it would be a good thing for them to choose to do so; or to state that no one should violently stop another person from taking drugs but that to do so would be a morally bad choice and that we would not wish to associate with those people; or to state that you can’t stop a person from making racist comments but you would think that such a person is an ignorant and repugnant bigot. Or, of course, you might conclude the opposite if you can persuasively argue your case. What is important is that you engage with the issue and do not stop short at merely analysing an action or end as non-violent and then having nothing more to say. But the views that you espouse will not be made in your capacity as a libertarian – libertarianism only forming the bedrock of your moral outlook – but as a choosing, desiring, valuing and acting human being who takes his place in society. Nevertheless, the more you build your personal moral views upon a libertarian bedrock, the stronger that bedrock becomes by demonstrating conclusively that libertarians as human beings are not morally vacuous but can, indeed, hold a flourishing and well-developed positive moral theory that addresses the moral concerns of everyone else in society. Indeed, summing up what we have concluded in this section, we might say that a “thick” conception of libertarianism would serve to undermine and destroy it both intellectually and practically; whereas libertarians possessing an otherwise “thick” and engaging supra-libertarian moral outlook separate from but compatible with libertarianism, would very much promote it.

Morality and Religion in a Free Society

One of our conclusions above was that even though a debate concerning which values and ends are likely to prevail in a free society has nothing to do with libertarianism’s place in the sphere of moral and political theory, there is still some purpose and merit in venturing to speculate upon whether, in a world that was completely free from government force and compulsion and which was founded upon the institutions of self-ownership and private property, these facts in and of themselves would encourage a general supra-libertarian morality in a particular direction. For example, if left to their own devices, would that very fact cause people be more likely to create a world of inclusion, non-discrimination based upon race, gender, sexual orientation, etc., would it be secular or religious, multi-cultural or strictly divided, and so on? Would it be a world in which drugs and recreational substance use is widespread or is it more likely to encourage restraint and conservatism in such use? Would it be a world of close connections of family and friendship or would there be more “free love” and sexual experimentation? Even though as a matter of pure logic, libertarianism is compatible with any moral theory so long as the ends posited by that theory do not invade the private property of anyone else, it is submitted that, in practice, it is not likely to work out that way and that we can expect at least a certain kind of supra-libertarian moral order to exist by virtue of the fact that a society is founded upon the institution of private property. What follows is the author’s speculation upon what kind of order this will be.

The foundation of this speculation is the observation that wherever human freedom has been unshackled and free enterprise has been allowed to pursue whatever ends it chooses with relatively less molestation, individuals have chosen to engage in processes that increase their material prosperity ahead of simply sitting around day dreaming and enjoying endless leisure time. The capacity for energy and enterprise has increased, the division of labour has widened and the material standard of living has risen. This may partly be implied in the logic of action itself as increased freedom leads to greater or more successful action and is therefore, likely to result in more actions and more improvement. It is also the case that fulfilment of more ethereal needs such as spirituality, rejuvenation, relaxation, meditation, and so on can only come about once material needs have been satisfied so that even if one was to pursue the former the latter would have to be conquered first. Nevertheless, it is an empirical observation and there has never been any strict requirement for individuals to choose to engage in production rather than simply extending their leisure time4. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the creation of a free society would lead to expansion of the division of labour, the accumulation of capital, an increase in production, and of the material standard of living.

What we can note about this fact is that those who, in a free society, accumulate income and wealth and hence possess a greater ability to direct economic resources are those who serve the needs of consumers. At the level of the capitalist-entrepreneurs, therefore, this will require a number of different qualities: the patience and low time preference to accumulate capital; good judgment, foresight and prudence in directing that capital to where it is most needed; empathy and understanding of one’s customers; and the sociability and communicability required to engage and motivate contractors, colleagues, and employees. The capitalist-entrepreneurs in turn will look for employees who are hard-working, educated, reliable, trustworthy and the employees will therefore seek to spend their money on consumers’ goods that will nurture, within them, these qualities. In other words serving the needs of others and the qualities and characteristics required to do so are ends that would be encouraged by the adoption of a free society. Resources therefore will accumulate in the hands of those who display these qualities and would disappear from the hands of those who do not; qualities and characteristics that harm or otherwise interfere with one’s ability to serve others – laziness, high time preference, a lack of empathetic understanding, unreliability, and on so – will be discouraged and are likely to diminish.  While, therefore, it is possible for persons to engage in endless leisure time and spend their entire day indulging in activities such as drinking, drug-taking and having sex, the resources available for them to do so will be limited and they are likely to be excluded from all prospects of increasing those resources as the habits in which they indulge are antithetical to any method of doing so (i.e. serving others) on the free market.

Second, is a free society likely to be non-discriminatory, and inclusive of all genders, races, religious beliefs, sexual orientations, and so on, or will it be highly segregated and exclusive? We can speculate that there will be two outcomes to this question rather than one. First, in the impersonal and arm’s length dealings of the marketplace, it is likely that all factors that are not relevant to one’s ability to serve the needs of others will be excluded from consideration. If I buy a sweater from a shop it is not likely to make any difference to me whether it was made by a man or a woman, by a white or a black, by a gay or a straight, by a pious Christian or a devil-worshipper. I am so far removed from the complex chain of production that any prejudice or preference I might have in this sweater being made by someone of a particular creed or colour is likely to recede drastically. If consumers do not care about a worker’s personal qualities other than his/her ability to serve the consumer’s ends then neither may capitalist-entrepreneurs do so in the chain of production as they are forced to adhere to their customers’ wishes. If I am looking to hire an employee for my enterprise, the costs of excluding the best person for the job based on some discriminatory ground will mean that I fail to keep up with my competition and will lose money faster. It is true that certain industries will serve different types of people and that certain personal qualities are likely to make one more adept at serving the needs of people who are similar to you. Christians may be better at investing in, producing, marketing and serving specific goods that are desired by other Christians; gay men may be the best people to do the same for gay men, and so on. And people of certain genders, races or cultures may be attracted to certain types of employment ahead of others. It might also be true that a person feels more comfortable if the precise person who serves them at the front line is someone of their ilk – the familiarity of a similar person perhaps helping to grease the wheels of commerce if empathy, advice or understanding is needed to assist a person with his purchase. But all of this only produces an outcome that better serves the needs of consumers and is not based on race, gender, or sexual orientation per se. If a pious, heterosexual woman could develop, market and serve products to gay men better than other gay men could then she would receive their custom and gay male vendors would not. Furthermore, in the vast array of production of goods that are common to all or most of us and are not produced for a specific category of person, any kind of discrimination in the chain of production is likely to diminish as we will always go to the people who can provide those goods at the lowest cost. Freedom under the division of labour does not require everyone to like or love everyone else, or for everyone to be liked or loved; it only requires you to serve them and the skills that each person can offer in this regard are likely to trump any other factors when it comes to the question of inclusion or exclusion. Our second possible outcome, however, might be slightly different. In the area of personal or familiar relations – as opposed to the arm’s length and impersonal relations of the marketplace – discrimination and exclusion may become more, rather than less intense. Although it is possible for the inclusion of the marketplace to encourage and foster a blending of different people – after all, if you work in the same factory, shop or office as someone of a different race or culture, there is the possibility or even the likelihood, that you will become friends simply through the opportunity of contact – on the whole, people tend to prefer the comfort of familiarity, similarity and uniformity. Individual residential areas and communities, therefore, might be internally homogenous and will cater only to the needs of the type of person living there, even though those communities will be happy to trade with others of a different type in the marketplace. This is not to imply, of course, that each different community will actively hate any other and can only barely stand to engage in mutual trade. Rather, it is likely to be a cordial, peaceful and even friendly co-existence. All we are suggesting is that when it comes to a matter of highest preference people are likely to opt for those who are similar to them in their personal and family relationships – such a preference not requiring you to hate anyone who is not similar. In any case, this entire speculation may be wrong and perhaps people will choose to mix more in their personal relationships as well as in their professional. The beauty of the market is that as we do not force anyone to adhere to a certain set of principles then we do not know the precise outcome; all we know is that that which results is the outcome that will satisfy everybody as far as possible.

The third consideration is related to the previous two. As there is no welfare state in a free society and nobody will have the right to violently wrestle resources from anyone else in the event of unemployment or need, the cultivation of personal relationships becomes relatively more important as there may come a day when we will need to rely upon those relationships if we are in dire need. We can speculate, therefore, that the institutions of family and friendship will strengthen in a free society. Such institutions will seek to include those who are trustworthy, reliable, sociable and responsible and will exclude those who are deceitful, unreliable, unfriendly and selfish. There is also likely to be less “free love” and sexual promiscuity in favour of longer term relationships and marriage that produce children, the latter being those upon whom you can rely when you reach old age and infirmity. Furthermore, as there will be no state-supported child rearing in a free society, only those who accumulate enough wealth by serving the needs of others will be able to afford to raise children. Although some of the qualities necessary for serving the needs of others that are inherent in the parent may be passed on genetically (so that people lacking those qualities will simply cease to be born in significant numbers), even if they are not then the parents are likely to foster the qualities in their children that made them, the parents, successful. Moreover, given that the parents will one day die and wish to leave their wealth to their children they are likely to require the reassurance that the fruits of their life’s work is being left to decent, responsible hands. They are not likely to be content to leave their wealth to a lazy, ill-educated drug addict.

What we have hypothesised, therefore, is that a free society, in which everyone must possess the ability to serve the needs of consumers in order to attract income and wealth, is likely to result in a cultivation of the qualities necessary for doing so, such a cultivation producing a relatively “conservative” (with a small “c”) society. This society will discriminate less on the bases of gender, race, colour, etc. but rather upon the specifically chosen behaviour of free individuals. Those who behave in accordance with ways that serve the needs of consumer and develop the characteristics necessary for doing so will be included. Those who do not are likely to be excluded. We must emphasise, however, that nothing of what we have said requires an individual libertarian to support or promote these ends. Only if people turn down the path of increasing their material welfare and expanding the division of labour would qualities and values necessary for serving others become prominent and our speculation is based only upon the fact that this is the choice that has been made in the past. It is possible for the individual libertarian to advocate a different choice and for free individuals to make it.

One final interesting question concerns the place of religion and religious worship in a free society. Religion has always fundamentally concerned three questions – why we are here; how we got here; and what we should do now that we are here. The pondering of these questions and the result of a shared belief as to their answers among individuals is, of course, logically compatible with libertarianism so long as its practice is peaceful and voluntary. However, the inability of early thought to separate phenomena from purposeful intent resulted in the fact that these questions have not been addressed with mutual exclusivity. Why we are here has been ascribed to the purposeful desire of one or more deities; how we got here was a result of that deity’s action; and it followed, therefore, that what we should do while we are here was to bow to that deity’s commands. Therefore, given the deep-seated need in the human psyche to fill the void that is left by these problems and the resulting imperatives that may be dispensed, whoever has been able to provide the gateway to these answers has enjoyed an immense amount of power – tell people where they came from and how it was done then you can tell people what they should do. Religion has therefore always attracted to its ranks the greedy and the power hungry and it is no accident that it has, throughout much of history, been aligned with the state – limited not just to established churches, but to the extent that the king or emperor himself was elevated to the rank of a God. Although early Christianity and the Thomist emphasis on the natural law diminished this welding for a time, the Protestant Reformation and the rejection, by John Calvin and Martin Luther, of reasoned ethics served to make religion once more a tool of, rather than a controlling force over, absolute rulers. Furthermore, religious wars and crusades have often been wars of power and control rather than strictly over the question of belief. Much of the history of religion has therefore been distinctly anti-libertarian. These days, of course, the development of scientific knowledge has stepped in to answer the puzzle of how we got here, which has served, for many people, to sever any connection between the cause of the universe and any moral imperatives they may face in their daily lives. However, there are two severe limitations to this. First, a knowledge of the natural sciences itself posits no moral theory and, other than agreeing that the pursuit of truth is a good and valuable thing, scientists can offer no moral guidance. They might be able to tell you what will happen when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman, and they could describe the shock you would get if you were to put your fingers into a power socket; but they will not, as a result of their discipline alone, be able to tell you why you should or should not do these things. Rather than replacing religious imperatives, the secularity encouraged by science has, rather, left an empty vacuum. Indeed, knowledge derived from scientific research has been used for some horrendously evil ends as well as good. Secondly the purpose of science is to trace the effects of phenomena back to their ultimate cause; yet the human mind is not able, in the physical and logical dimension it inhabits, to comprehend the concept of an ultimate cause. Every cause that we discover in turn becomes another effect whose existence and characteristics must be ascribed to some further cause that must be investigated. The concept of God is an attempt to deal with this teleological problem; we ascribe to God abilities and characteristics that defy normal explanation, yet our image of him – as a distinct consciousness, a father-figure, etc. – couches these characteristics in a manner that we can understand. Indeed, one of the frequent objections to the existence of God pronounced by atheists – “why are there so many Gods and which one is the right God?” – is perhaps not as interesting as the question as to why they are all so similar. Nearly always they are paternalistic humanoids, they are responsible for all creation and all life and they are the dispensers – if not always the practitioners – of morality. Rather than there being many different Gods, different cultures and traditions have ascribed broadly similar characteristics, varying only in their own cultural idiosyncrasies, to what is roughly the same being in order to create a giant metaphor for things that we do not and perhaps cannot ever understand. Science, or anything else, has not yet provided a sufficient alternative answer to this problem. Indeed, the existence of God is not viewed by believers as a strictly scientific problem like any other. The tools of science – the laws of physics and the laws of logic – are themselves part of the very phenomenon under investigation – creation – and are subject to God’s will. As tools for explaining their creator they therefore appear hopelessly blunt, if not, completely inadequate. None of this, of course, is meant to condone belief and condemn non-belief, or vice versa. Rather it is an attempt to explain why people hold the beliefs that they do.

Having said all of this, what can we conclude about religion and libertarianism? It is difficult to say whether a free society will encourage or discourage religious practice. What we can be certain of, however, is that it will continue to be a very strong force in the world, probably for a long time. There is clearly a need somewhere in the human psyche, possessed by a great many individuals, to ponder the origins of the universe, not just the how, where and the when but the why. Given our inability to meet these needs we can be sure that a libertarian world will have to find some way to deal with religion. Whether this will be mere accommodation, opposition, or embracing will be dependent upon whether religion in turn neutrally respects, is opposed to, or actively supports libertarian principles. There are one or two arguable reasons for at least an accommodation. First, there are many libertarian imperatives, rules, parables and examples in religious texts. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, contain some strong libertarian imperatives and the remainder is not avowedly unlibertarian. There is no reason why, in a libertarian world, religions should not emphasise a more libertarian bedrock for their further moral teachings. Secondly, religion would be expected to dissolve its historical marriage to power and the state, a dissolution that may not occur easily. Yet so too will everyone else have to do the same – bureaucrats, politicians, favoured corporations, and so on. Nobody will be able to latch onto and use the mantle of the state to pursue their ends. There is no reason why religious people should find this more difficult than anyone else. Given that a libertarian world is unlikely to appear unless a majority of the citizenry come to believe in the justice of libertarianism, congregations themselves should already have embraced the libertarian mind-set. Finally, we may consider the problem of so-called religious extremism, the sort of extremism that wishes to destroy or violently repress anything contrary to its teachings. Particularly, at this time, we might as well mention the dominant issue of Islamic fundamentalism that fuels terrorism. Whatever political system is adopted and whatever the view of the majority of people with regards to their rights and obligations towards others, there will always be fundamentalists, radicals, extremists, zealots and revolutionaries in just the same way as there will always be murderers, rapists, thieves and fraudsters. Many of these will, from any common standard, be lunatics, nutcases or simply deluded fools. Left to their own devices, as they would be in a libertarian world, these people would simply be a bare minority of loners who are unable to spread their views, with any violent attempt to accomplish their aims simply being classified as criminal behaviour like any other. The only reason that Islamic religious extremists who encourage terrorism and violence gain any traction whatsoever is because the foreign policy of the United States and its allies pours fuel onto the fire of what they are saying. The behaviour of Western governments – bombing civilians, invading sovereign countries, spreading a secular democracy – lends plausibility to religious extremism as both an explanation of and a solution for a very real and unwanted foreign incursion. With State power eliminated in a libertarian world, this problem would not exist and such religious extremism would be without a vehicle for motivation.

Conclusion

Summing up everything we have said, libertarianism, thinly conceived, is necessary to form the foundation of wider moral theory. Libertarianism is, therefore, not “thick”. Libertarians, themselves, however, must, in their capacity as human beings have a “thick” moral outlook, that outlook not being a part of libertarianism per se but built upon its firm foundations of self-ownership and private property and seeking to strengthen those foundations through non-violent enforcement. We can, though, speculate that a certain moral order may unfold in a society based upon self-ownership and private property if free individuals choose to expand their material well-being and widen the division of labour. That order is likely to emphasise roughly “conservative” values and while it is not possible to say whether religion is encouraged or discouraged by such an order we can conclude that it is likely to occupy a prominent place.

1Moral considerations may, of course, arise out of concerns for the welfare of the matter – for example, whether the act of a human being may legitimately cause an animal (a non-actor) pain and suffering. But such considerations only concern whether it is good for the human to be the initiator of the animal’s experience of pain and do not create any reciprocal moral rights in the animal.

2Llewellyn H Rockwell Jr., The Future of Libertarianism, lewrockwell.com, May 1st 2014.

3Walter Block identifies a number of prominent libertarians who draw either right wing or left wing conclusions from libertarian foundations. See Walter Block, Libertarianism is unique; it belongs neither to the right nor the left: a critique of the views of Long, Holcombe, and Baden on the left, Hoppe, Feser and Paul on the right” Journal of Libertarian Studies; Vol. 22: 127–70.

4Those who hark back to the pre-industrial era seem to assume that this is how blissful and care-free life used to be, overlooking the fact that the need to provide enough food alone necessitated back breaking amounts of work.