Free Trade and the US


One of the characteristics of the anti-globalisation movement personified by US President Donald Trump is its apparent opposition to free trade. Free trade is not only associated with the globalisation agenda of the liberal elite but is also held responsible for the shipping of jobs and production overseas where cheaper labour and cheaper raw materials can be exploited, leaving at home nothing but crumbling factories and swathes of unemployed workers. Hence a considerable part of Trump’s “America First” programme appears to be devoted to distinctly anti-free trade measures, such as increased protectionism and tax penalties for firms relocating jobs overseas.

What should be the reaction of Austro-libertarians to this phenomenon? Do we not believe that free trade is almost the very essence of freedom and the fountain of prosperity? Should we not oppose any attempt to restrain trade by either tariffs or regulations? On the other hand, what are we to do when such policies are seemingly associated with nothing but destitution and misery for a significant proportion of the population?

For libertarians to simply repeat like a broken tape that trade should be left “free” runs the risk of considering only surface phenomena while failing to examine deeper, underlying problems. In the first place, of course, the association of the globalising movement with free trade is patently false. Those behind this movement are not in favour of genuine free trade; rather, they promote a heavily managed trade environment – one governed by trade agreements, trade deals, and a complex myriad of rules and regulations which favour only large corporations and the politically well connected. Indeed, trade agreements and trade deals are the antithesis of free trade, the latter of which demands a complete absence of the state from any involvement in trade. The terms “free trade agreements” and “free trade deals” are therefore nothing more than meaningless doublethink. A grave mistake that the anti-globalisation movement is likely to make is to confuse political globalisation – the consolidation of and intensified co-operation between states and state institutions, which is a relatively new phenomenon – with economic globalisation, which is private institutions trading peacefully and voluntarily on terms agreed by themselves, a situation which has existed for centuries. Political globalisation should be opposed bitterly while economic globalisation and the expansion of the international division of labour should be promoted. The bigger problem, however, is the fact that free trade today, if it is genuinely free, is carried out in a context where there is a gross, underlying violation of private property rights – in other words where the players who are demanding freedom are benefitting from the curtailment of other people’s freedom. For instance, banks are restrained from being “free” by heavy regulation and oversight because their lending activities have the tendency to blow up bubbles which lead to crippling busts. However, the reason for this tendency is that banks are, simultaneously, legally privileged (by the ability to hold only fractional reserves) and economically privileged (by being the first parties to receive new money that is freshly printed central bank – money which is itself, of course, subject to legal tender laws and of which the central bank is legally privileged as the sole issuer). It would be a travesty for Austro-libertarians to respond to any call for increased bank regulation by pointing out that such regulations are a violation of freedom. While this is true in and of itself, the real problem is clearly the state’s monopoly money and its dissemination through fractional reserve banking. To take another example, entities that are endowed by the state with a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic privilege are normally able to charge higher prices to their customers and to pay lower prices to their suppliers. If, in response to the resulting “obscene” profits and high prices, the state proposes to regulate the prices of the entity’s products or tax away a significant portion of its profits, Austro-libertarians pointing out the pitfalls of price control and the injustice of taxation would be speaking the truth as far is goes. However, they would be ignoring the bigger, underlying problem which is the entity’s monopoly privilege, and that what is really needed is to rescind this privilege in order to open up the market to genuine competition. Only in this context is the freedom of firms to set prices both legitimate and economically beneficial.

When it comes to free trade, part of the underlying problem that is easy to ignore is that, of course, US workers are burdened by minimum wage laws and employment regulations which, to any employer, makes them relatively more expensive than workers overseas who may not be burdened by such interventions. However, the bigger “macro” problem is the fact that trade today takes place with the exchange of state-issued, paper currency which can be expanded at will, rather than with “sound” money such as gold or silver. The added complication in the case of the United States is that it is, currently, the issuer of the world’s reserve currency. What we will see is that, even without minimum wage laws and employment regulations, this would cause jobs to vanish overseas.

When the entire world is trading with “sound” money such as gold the prices of labour in the US and overseas depend upon the relative supply and demand for gold and for labour in each location. In which circumstances could labour be cheaper overseas? (By “cheaper” we mean that wages are lower per unit of production and not per hour. Wages in developed countries are higher per hour because labourers there can produce more in each hour on account of the relatively high amount of capital goods per worker – more tools, machines, factories and so on. Wages in poorer countries may be lower per hour because each worker can produce less per hour, but in equilibrium they would not be lower per unit of production). If labour is cheaper overseas then it means there is a relatively higher supply of money and a relatively lower supply of labour in the US while there is a relatively lower supply of money and a relatively higher supply of labour overseas. Employers therefore divert more of their funds to employing workers overseas in order to take advantage of the lower wages. This, however, is simply the correction of a disequilibrium which will reach its own natural limit. As money leaves the US then money there will become relatively scarcer while the amount of labour will remain the same and so US wages will fall; the new money flowing into countries overseas, on the other hand, will cause wages there to rise. At some point wages both at home and overseas will equalise. Of course, if the reverse happens – that wages are higher overseas than in the US – then the opposite process will occur, with money being drawn out of overseas countries and coming home to the US to bid up wage rates there. All of this is part of the natural process of economising behaviour which seeks to employ resources across the world by directing them to their most highly valued use. Absent any further state interference such as minimum wage laws and onerous employment regulations, all workers, both overseas and at home, will end up employed at the same wage rate (per unit of production).

What happens, however, when we are trading not with “sound” money, such as gold or silver, but, rather, with a paper money which can be issued by the state at will? If the domestic state chooses to expand the supply of money then this will cause an effect similar to that we just outlined. The supply of money at home will increase causing local prices – including wages – to rise. Prices overseas, however, will not yet have risen on account of the fact that the new money has not yet reached there. This process takes places through the complicating factor of the exchange rates between currencies, which is itself, of course, a price and is subject to the same influences. If the US prints more money but the overseas country does not then the first firms to spend the newly printed money on foreign currency will benefit from the old exchange rate and will be able to obtain more foreign currency than they otherwise would have which they can then use for purchasing goods and labour from abroad. Firms will therefore divert more of their spending to importing resources and seeking foreign labour than they would domestic labour. For the majority of countries such printing of currency can have only a very limited effect. If the inflation is a one shot affair then, eventually, increased bidding for foreign currency with the newly printed money will cause the exchange rate to adjust, strengthening foreign currencies and weakening the domestic currency. Fewer units of foreign currency can be bought with the additional supply of domestic currency and so the attractiveness of foreign goods and services diminishes, vanishing entirely when the currencies reach purchasing power parity. Currencies reach a state of purchasing power parity when the exchange rate between currencies and between goods is harmonious. For example, if an apple costs two South African Rands or one US Dollar, then in a state of purchasing power parity one US Dollar would equal two South African Rands. At this point there is no additional benefit from buying goods and services from abroad than there is from buying them at home. If, on the other hand, the inflation is continuous then such continuation comes to be expected. This expectation of inflation will in and of itself cause a much quicker adjustment to the exchange rate than previously, thus nullifying, or at least blunting, the benefits to the recipients of the newly printed money, robbing them of the power to ship jobs and the supply of resources overseas. The only thing that is experienced is domestic price rises. Of course, if the continuous inflation becomes abusive then it sows the seeds of hyperinflation as bigger and bigger doses of inflation are required in order to “cheat” inflationary expectations until the inflation reaches such a degree that such cheating is no longer possible and price rises even begin to exceed the rate of inflation. By this point, needless to say, a country has a lot more to worry about that jobs being shipped overseas. Thus what we can see is that with both “sound” money and independently issued, national paper monies mechanisms exist which prevent a permanent loss of jobs and the sourcing of supplies from overseas.

The situation is different, however, where the issuer of the paper currency happens to be the issuer of the world’s reserve currency. This is the dubiously privileged position in which the US and the US Dollar finds itself today. For when a country is the issuer of the world’s reserve currency the price adjustment mechanisms that we outlined above, which prevent the permanent loss of jobs overseas, are disrupted.

The US Dollar became the world’s reserve currency partly as a legacy of the Bretton Woods gold exchange standard, where the US pyramided the issue of US dollars on gold and the rest of the world pyramided its currencies on the US dollar. Today, however, the US dollar owes it reserve status largely to the petrodollar system – the agreement of oil exporting countries, led by their lynchpin, Saudi Arabia, to price and sell oil in US dollars – and the resulting domination of US based financial networks. The upshot of all of this is that in order the buy oil (which everybody needs) and in order to engage in international commerce pretty much everybody everywhere must buy and hold a significant quantity of US dollar reserves. And as the demand for oil has increased over the past forty years so too has the demand for the US dollar. Thus there has existed a continuously buoyant demand for the holding of US dollars which is sufficient to outstrip the increase in any supply of those US dollars. This buoyancy of demand is also maintained and strengthened by the fact that several countries, most notably China, unit recently pegged their currency to the dollar in order to fuel export driven growth. In other words, they deliberately weakened their own currency by printing more of it to buy dollars, thus pushing up dollar demand and increasing Renminbi supply. Even though China has used most of those dollars to purchase US treasury bonds, thus nullifying the increase in demand for US dollars, it would still be the case that their own currency would emerge weaker (which if, of course, the entire point of the peg). This leads us onto the next problem and one that is most relevant to the recent past – that the reserve currency becomes a “safe haven” asset. The US dollar index, which tracks the value of the dollar against a basket of other currencies, has risen since 2011, particularly as a result of crises in the Eurozone which has served to weaken the world’s second most dominant currency, the Euro. Indeed, against the US dollar, every single major currency is lower than it was five years ago. This is something that US dollar doomsayers are yet to understand. Yes, the dollar is being printed into oblivion, but so too is every other currency; the dollar just happens to be the least rotten apple in the cart.

The effects of all this are that when the Federal Reserve prints fresh, US dollars domestic prices will rise. However, because the dollar is able to maintain its strength on the world stage vis-à-vis other currencies, holders of US dollars find themselves in the continued position of being able to source goods and services cheaper from abroad than they can at home. Indeed, for several decades now the US dollar has effectively been able to buy more than it is really worth. People happily hand over goods and services in exchange for the medium with which they can trade oil and engage in international commerce. Because the US can simply buy what it needs by printing a currency which everyone wants, the result has been to turn it into a giant consumer economy rather than a producer economy – an economy which has no need for jobs. After all, why not just put all of those jobless people on welfare that can be paid for with printed dollars which will buy them Chinese goods? Indeed, in spite of the resilience of the American entrepreneurial spirit, the US is, today, a very difficult place in which to be a producer. According to a ranking by the World Bank, the US was as low as the 51st best place in which to start a business, a paltry 39th best place in which to deal with building permits, ranked only 36th for the ease of obtaining electricity, registering property and for taxes, and 35th for trading across borders. Yet, in full congruence with what we have explained here, the US was, apparently, the second best place in the world in which to obtain credit! Other rankings tell much the same story, with Forbes placing the US at 23rd overall on their list of best places to do business at the end of 2016 – not too bad, you might say, until you realise that is was ranked first just ten years ago.

Needless to say, much of the global monetary situation may now be changing, particularly with moves by China – itself a big consumer of oil – to compete with the petrodollar system and to establish alternative clearing institutions for international commerce that are not reliant upon the US dollar. What we can see from all this, however, is that, on the one hand, to blame free trade for the flight of US jobs overseas is clearly incorrect; yet it is foolish and naïve for Austro-libertarians to defend free trade on the surface when the underlying property rights are far from free. The lesson to be learnt, therefore, is that when confronting issues that threaten our freedom, Austro-libertarians should remember to examine them on the deepest possible level and not simply react to what they see in plain sight.

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It is accepted by the mainstream that state regulation of the free market is a necessary feature of the so-called “mixed economy”, the supposed halfway house that allows us to benefit from capitalism without succumbing to its alleged excesses while, at the same time, avoiding the catastrophe of all-out socialisation and state control. This essay will subject this view to a critique and will reveal that, in fact, regulation of markets does nothing more than substitute arbitrary government preferences for the preferences of freely acting individuals, is a cause of the very “excesses” (such as oversized firms) which are blamed on capitalism, and that the best regulator is, in fact, the free market itself.

In examining “regulation” we should first be clear about precisely what it means, which is that the state will use the force of law in order to, compel, prohibit, restrict or otherwise subject to control some targeted behaviour of its citizens. In other words, it is a violent, physical intervention into people’s lives in order to produce one outcome while preventing another. This seems perfectly justifiable in instances when the behaviour that is subject to regulation is neither peaceful nor voluntary and is in fact invasive and predatory – in other words the particular behaviour under consideration constitutes a crime, such as murder and theft. However much libertarians may dispute either the legitimacy or effectiveness of the state in preventing and/or responding to such acts, we can at least understand the need for this kind of regulation – to protect people from the violent, invasive and uninvited actions of others, actions which are, of course, unjustifiable in libertarian theory. But what do we mean by state regulation of the free market? The very phrase “free market” is an abstraction used deliberately by commentators to deflect attention away from what it actually is and to create, instead, the impression that it is some kind of self-aware, self-controlling entity that can indulge in all of its irrational flights of fancy while being subject to neither rule nor reason when it seemingly appears out of nowhere to inflict grave harm upon us in the same way that a criminal might. The free market, however, is nothing more than individual people and institutions trading goods and services voluntarily on terms which they agree amongst themselves. It is a diffuse, decentralised network of people striving to meet their own needs as they perceive them and to seek others to provide the wherewithal to better their lives. It is an entirely peaceful, voluntary operation and no one is forced to participate in any exchange with another individual if he does not believe that he will be better off as a result of the exchange. For the state to regulate the market, then, means that the state will use force in order to diminish, control or otherwise outlaw certain transactions which otherwise may have been undertaken voluntarily had the regulation not been present. For the state to regulate is to introduce a code of violent compulsion into otherwise peaceful and voluntary relationships.

There is something distinctly odd when state “protection” through regulation is extended beyond crimes into the arena of voluntary relations. For what is it that people are really being protected from here? Voluntary transactions do not come out of nowhere to surprise us like an armed robber might do. Rather, they must be chosen freely and consciously by each individual person. So if every transaction in the free market requires a voluntary choice then the only purpose of regulation must be to “protect” us from the results of our own choices and to prevent us from entering certain transactions which we may otherwise like to enter if the terms are attractive to us. People often think that those being regulated are unscrupulous vendors who may try to sell us some kind of snake oil solution to a problem we may have. It is true, of course, that crooked businessmen may try to sell us something that doesn’t really work, is a fake, or causes some kind of fire or damage. However, these instances constitute a fraud or a tort and are already governed by the area of the law that regulates involuntary or invasive acts. Regulation of the free market, on the other hand, is solely concerned with restricting the transactions that people may be happy to undertake voluntarily with no force or fraud. As it takes two to complete a transaction – the purchaser and the vendor – if businesses are prevented from choosing to sell then you are equally prevented from choosing to buy. Our choices are therefore constricted by state regulation as much as those of businesses selling to us are and it is us who are regulated as much as businesses are. It is for this reason that an excessively regulatory and bureaucratic jurisdiction is often nicknamed “the nanny state” – a persistent and seemingly omnipresent matriarch who never ceases to stop interfering in your life in order to make sure that you make the “right” choices, choices that it believes are better for your life regardless of the maturity and sophistication of your own decision-making process.

There are several mantras or excuses that the state uses to justify its regulation of voluntary transactions – the prevention of rash, impulsive or short sighted behaviour; imperfect or otherwise flawed knowledge on the part of one of the parties to the transaction; maintaining standards of quality; and finally, the great all-encompassing excuse that seems to validate the state’s wading into anything it pleases, which is maintaining standards of safety. Doubtless there are other categories of state regulation also (such as environmental regulation and control of so-called “essential” industries) but these four form the backbone of the state’s regulatory bodies. We will proceed now to examine each of them in turn and in doing so we will reveal the damaging effects of state regulation while demonstrating how, in fact, the free market itself is the best regulator.

First, then, is the prevention of rash, impulsive, or short sighted behaviour. The implication here is that people may enter a transaction which provides, or has a chance of providing, benefits in the short term while providing a high likelihood of burdens in the future – possibly severely detrimental burdens such as economic ruin, ill health or early mortality. So in other words, people may choose to use tobacco, alcohol or narcotic products to achieve an immediate sense of pleasure without considering the longer term effects, or they may choose to gamble, bet, or otherwise enter some kind of financial arrangement that promises untold wealth if it is successful, but may result in economic ruin if it is not. In economic jargon the complaint here is that people’s time preferences are too high and that the inducement towards the present good is so strong in people’s minds that they heavily discount the possibility of the future bad. People discard prudence, foresight, and good judgment in favour of emotional, impulsive and irrational motives, and so the state should step in, so the argument goes, in order to prevent people from falling victim to their own lack of patience. In the first place we might as well mention that, while it is true that some or, indeed, many decisions may be regretted after the fact, it is the case that all actions can result in consequences that are either detrimental or not as favourable as those that were intended. Prior to an action, costs and benefits are only hypothetical and it is always easy to judge an action with the benefit of a retrospective view. However, as it is also true that some actions are more likely or are guaranteed to produce a longer term detriment in spite of an immediate gain, the more important point is that people’s time preferences are no business of the state’s and it is dubious to assert that people should, in all instances, prefer the longer term to the shorter term – at least not to the extent that the force of law is used to compel such a preference. There is no reason, for instance, why someone should not value the immediate pleasure from a cigarette instead of a longer, healthier lifespan and it is quite possible for an individual to regard a longer life as duller if it is devoid of short term pleasantries. The regulation of an action may stop, restrict, or otherwise control the action but it does not stop the motivating desires behind the action itself which are imbedded wholly within people’s minds. The preferences that influenced them still exist and have not been eradicated, and people are, instead, forced to embrace an outcome which they do not regard as preferable. So in other words, while the individual may have to forego a benefit today, in his own mind the pain of having done so in order to wait for another benefit to come sometime in the future (such as a longer, healthier life) may be worse to that individual. That person, from his point of view, suffered a loss rather than a gain. Regulation doesn’t, therefore, make benefits appear and costs disappear; rather, it simply forces people to endure what are, in their minds, heavier costs.

However, even if we were to accept the premise that people should take the longer view, the irony here is that regulation and state interference into people’s lives is what causes high time preference and rash, impulsive behaviour in the first place, along with the eradication of any kind of prudence, patience, good foresight and self-responsibility. In particular, the existence of the regulatory state fosters the mind-set that if an action is dangerous, or has a high chance of producing an unfavourable outcome, then the state will ensure that it is banned or the dangerous elements are removed. In other words because an army of bureaucrats has gone through the decision-making process on your behalf you simply do not have to care or pay any attention to the possible negative results of your actions because the guiding hand of the state will ensure that only good things can flow from anything you do. Indeed, the regulatory state is little more than a giant, inflatable cushion for people to avoid having to take responsibility for the consequences of their own decisions. When, of course, a decision in an unregulated area turns sour the cry is always “why were they allowed to sell this awful thing to me!” whereas what they really mean is “why was I allowed to choose to buy this awful thing from them!” What results, therefore, is a vicious circle where the growing regulatory state induces less prudence, a lower standard of care and thus more bad decisions that need to be met by increased regulation. To make matters worse if the regulatory state fails and you do happen to suffer some negative consequences, then in comes the helping hand the welfare state to rescue you anyway. If you drink or smoke too much and fall sick then state provided healthcare will look after you; if you gamble away your life savings then state benefits will still keep you fed, watered and sheltered even if you haven’t achieved the riches that you might have had you been successful. The upside of all of these decisions remains intact – that lucky horse may still promise to pay out millions and the whiskey will taste as good – but the downside has been heavily reduced as the state has insulated you from having to realise, or pay for, the full extent of the natural penalties of your actions if they occur. Thus, these types of frivolous and imprudent actions have become more attractive rather than less, and so they will be taken more frequently rather than less, resulting in more negative consequences rather than fewer. The result of this is, of course, moral hazard – carelessness for your actions when you can preserve your gains while heaping your losses onto everyone else. And finally, of course, all of this takes place within the sphere of the state’s inducement of a high consumption, high time preference society through the illusion of prosperity brought about by the forced lowering of interest rates, monetary inflation and the smokescreen of paper wealth.

Obviously, in a society that is wholly unregulated by the state people would be responsible for their own actions, and a culture of better decision making and more prudential planning would be induced. This does not mean, however, that you are completely on your own in determining whether you should proceed with a decision – an allegation of those who believe that the free market leads to an atomistic existence. It is this aspect that we will now explore when we examine the next reason that is proffered for the supposed necessity of regulation – imperfect or otherwise flawed knowledge on the part of one of the parties to the transaction. It is usually the case, of course, that the sellers of everything we choose to buy are experts in that particular product or service they are selling. They developed the product; they know what it should be capable of; they know the science behind it; they know where its raw materials or ingredients came from, who put them all together and how; they spend all day studying and marketing to their target demographic. We, on the other hand, are not so expert in these products, of which we may buy tens or even hundreds in a given week. We do not have the time to sift through mountains of information in order to find out whether a particular product is suitable for us, or whether it is likely to end up being either a waste of money or the cause of a much steeper loss. Surely the state should step in and compel companies to provide more information about their products? Surely it is only because of state regulation that we have mandatory lists of ingredients and nutritional breakdowns on food products and surely it is only because of the mandatory inclusion of warning labels that we know not to iron clothes while we are wearing them?

The key to unlocking this is to realise that the provision of information is an end in itself, an end which consumes scarce resources. Therefore, the value of this information needs to exceed the cost of those resources. To take a ridiculous example, the time it takes to cook an egg on the sunlit body of a car is a piece of information. The vendor of the car would spend valuable resources, such as labour, eggs, a stopwatch, etc. in gathering and publishing this information. However, if this information is useless to prospective purchasers of the car – in other words, it would not affect their desire to purchase the car one way or the other – then the vendor has incurred a deadweight cost and has simply wasted resources that would have been better spent on something else. How much information should be provided is part of the market process and it is consumers themselves who will determine through their purchasing habits whether or not a given set of information is valuable and is a requirement of a purchase. If consumers happily purchase products without receiving certain information then it indicates that the provision of such information would be a waste; if they choose to abstain then it may indicate that the purchase, on its present terms, is too risky and they require extra resources to be spent on providing more information about what it is they would be buying. It is here, of course, where the market’s own key regulator – price – steps in. At a low enough price consumers may be happy to purchase the product without further information as the risk of loss is relatively low so that gathering extra information would not be worthwhile. If the price was relatively high, however, consumers may demand more information so that they are more equipped for making a better decision before committing a relatively larger sum of money. And, of course, products sold with less information will, all else being equal, usually be priced lower than products sold with more information anyway on account of the fact that the vendor of the former products has not had to incur an extra cost. The forced provision of information by the state, however, is markedly different. Because it is not subject to the profit and loss test there is no way of telling whether such information is valuable or not; it is simply an arbitrary decree that resources must be directed in a way other than that desired by consumers. Additional costs are then heaped onto suppliers which, of course, result in higher prices for products – the extra money being spent on something that consumers simply do not want. To take a another extreme example, the state could mandate that an information booklet the size of a telephone directory should be sold with every loaf of bread, detailing the precise ingredients, the transportation process used, a detailed schematic of the ovens used for baking, the life stories of the baker and the wheat farmer and so on. It is obvious that the provision of this useless information would increase enormously the cost of a loaf of bread and thus make consumers worse off than they were before. The principle remains the same when the state requires seemingly more “sensible” – but still useless for the consumer – information to be provided.

The principle is also the same for the next two reasons that the state has for increasing the scope of regulation – maintaining standards of quality and standards of safety. The quality of a product is also part of the market process and cannot be subject to arbitrary standards. At any one time a higher quality product will, all else being equal, cost more than a lower quality product – meaning that more resources must be devoted to producing the higher quality product than the lower quality product. If more resources are used in creating a higher quality product then fewer resources are left over to be devoted to other things. Consumers must choose whether they wish their resources to be spent on a few higher quality or many more lower quality products through their purchasing habits. If they prefer the latter yet the government mandates that higher quality products must be produced then consumers are made worse off than they otherwise would have been. The sustainable way to increase quality is to increase the number of resources available so that such quality can now be afforded. It is here where the free market’s own regulatory mechanisms step in. If consumers, as a result of an increase of available wealth, demand that vendors produce higher quality items then quality standards are likely to develop within each industry. If vendors have to demonstrate that their products have reached a certain standard of quality then it creates a market for reputable, third party certifiers to examine the product and declare that it has met the required standards of quality that are expected by consumers. If it does not then no such declaration is made and the business must go back to the drawing board. Such third parties will be interested in making honest and trustworthy appraisals as it is the trustworthiness of their appraisals that lead to more product sales and hence, more vendors seeking their services for quality certification. Increased quality is therefore achieved through increased wealth creation which makes more resources available for this quality to be achieved, as opposed to state regulation which simply redirects existing resources from places where they are already needed.

Exactly the same is true when it comes to product safety because increasing safety also consumes valuable resources and we as consumers must determine how many resources we wish to divert from providing for other ends towards providing for more safety. With the regulation of product safety, it is important again to emphasise that we are not talking about the regulation of actions which may be defined as crimes or torts. If someone loads a child’s toy with explosives and it detonates then clearly such an action would be unlawful. Rather, what we are talking about is the regulation of safety standards that are accepted by both parties as terms of the contract – in other words, where the standards of safety sold are part of the product’s features or definition. For example, all else being equal, a car built with a thicker chassis, or a chassis constructed out of a stronger material, is likely to have greater crashworthiness than a car with a thinner chassis or a chassis constructed out of weaker material. If the latter car is purchased then the lower crashworthiness – and the resulting lower protection of the vehicle’s occupants in the event of a collision – is an accepted part of the contract and an accepted feature of the vehicle. Once again, the market’s own regulator – price – is king in this regard. All else being equal, the less safe car will be less expensive than the safer car. If consumers choose to purchase the less safe car the resources which could be spent on making the car safer are better off, from their point of view, being used somewhere else. If, however, the state steps in and mandates that, in the name of increasing safety, only the more expensive car should be sold then this would clearly lead to impoverishment. Indeed, some people may not even be able to afford the super safe car at all. They previously chose to purchase the less safe car because the value of the transportation it provided was worth the risk of being more heavily injured in the event of a crash. If state mandated “safety” standards price them out of the market so that they cannot afford a car at all then they have clearly lost very heavily. There is no such thing as a “no brainer” safety requirement that is valid in all places at all time – there is only what can be afforded. Requirements only seemingly become “no-brainer” when they can be easily afforded. And, of course, the way to increase the affordability of safety is to increase wealth creation so that more resources are available to be devoted towards increasing product safety. Just as with the increase of quality, if consumers, as a result of an increase of available wealth, demand that vendors produce safer items then industrywide standards of product safety will develop. If vendors have to demonstrate that their products have reached a certain standard of safety then, once again, the market is opened for reputable, third party certifiers to determine whether a product has achieved the standard that is expected by consumers. Underwriters Laboratories is an example of such a private, third party solution. Increased safety, like increase quality, is therefore achieved through increased wealth creation which makes more resources available for safer products to be made, as opposed to state regulation which simply confiscates existing resources from other ends.

What we have learnt from all of this is that regulation itself consumes valuable resources and so the value it produces must also take place in the societal rank of values. It cannot stand apart from the market process but must, rather, be part of it. The allegation that the markets are never “self-regulating” simply amounts to stating that people are not making the correct choices with resources that they own whereas the budding critic does. If the market is not “self-regulating” then, as we explained earlier, it means that people are not self-regulating and must be forced into making choices other than the ones that they prefer.

Earlier we explained how one of the tragic ironies of regulation is that it creates the very need for its own existence by perpetuating rash and foolish purchasing choices as people come to believe that the state is there to protect them from any possible negative consequence. Unfortunately, such a perpetuation is present on the supply side of the market as well. An increasing regulatory code heaps onto the shoulders of vendors increasing costs of compliance with that code. As well as spending money on market research, developing their products and targeting their advertising, prospective entrepreneurs not only have to hire armies of lawyers to ensure that they are complying with the regulatory code but very often the regulatory code itself will require the business to make an additional outlay – such as the requirement to publish extra information. The costs of compliance with regulation are more easily borne by large, established businesses yet they may be devastating to small start-ups or entrepreneurs with limited capital. For example, in a report for the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration, Nicole and Mark Crain of Lafayette University calculated that the per-employee cost of federal regulatory compliance was $10,585 for businesses with nineteen or fewer employees, but only $7,755 for companies with five hundred or more. It is for this reason why regulation is, in fact, favoured rather than opposed by large, established businesses – for it creates a cosy cartel between business and the state which shuts out most prospects of new competition while at the same time saving face when they duly comply with these regulations for the “benefit of the consumer”. However, such stifling of competition is what creates some of the very problems that regulations are supposed to solve – poor provision of information, poor quality, and poor safety features. The result, therefore, is that regulation needs to increase in order to produce standards of consumer service that the free market would have produced by itself – except now with the deduction of the enormous cost of passing, complying and monitoring the said regulations. All of the supposed pitfalls and excesses of capitalism are therefore not a product of the free market but are, in fact, spawned by the regulatory state – and the response is supposed to be more regulation and increased oversight by a growing state bureaucracy. The most complained about industries in the world today, such as utilities, public transport and healthcare, supposedly demonstrate the tragedy of allowing private actors to provide so-called “essential” goods and services. Yet it is those very industries that suffer from the heaviest state interference.

State regulation of the free market is, therefore, a truly self-perpetuating, self-growing monstrosity, creating the very problems it seeks to solve – lazy, careless, and thoughtless purchasing choices on the one hand, and an oligarchy of large, greedy, unscrupulous businesses on the other, stifling economic progress and innovation in favour of micromanagement by a faceless bureaucracy. It is also a symptom of the globalist elitist agenda to unify and harmonise state bureaucracies into international trade agreements and treaties so that the reach of control and top-down direction does not stop at the state border – an agenda that was recently rebuffed (although will probably not be solved) by both the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump as the next US President. If we wish to regain economic progress and win back our liberty then destroying the regulatory state must be a high priority.

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Britain and the EU

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On June 23rd of this year, Britain will hold a referendum on its membership of the European Union, voting either to remain (“Bremain”) or to leave (“Brexit”). The present author is rooting for a “Brexit”, which is unsurprising for a libertarian who detests any metastasised growth of the state that the EU certainly represents. Unfortunately, in spite of the passionate rhetoric that the issue tends to inspire in the so-called “Brexiteers”, from a libertarian point of view it is difficult to reconcile oneself with, or to endorse, some of the arguments that are emanating from the “Brexit” camp. In other words, it would be a mistake to characterise the debate as a defiant band of liberty lovers seeking to shake off the tyrannous ogre of a bloated, continental tyrant, although that is surely part of the motivation. Rather, many of the “Brexit” arguments, seeking to respond to the “Bremain” side, are couched in the same conventional, statist terms. They therefore lack any incisive bite that would provide a convincing case for withdrawing from the union.

The most prominent issues where this is visible are economic growth and trade. When it comes to the former, both sides fling at each other hypothesised GDP figures that show either a marked gain or reduction in the number. Obviously “Brexiteers” are attempting to show that the figures would be higher outside the EU whereas “Bremainers” are attempting to show the opposite. However, simply adding up flows of monetary expenditure (and then expecting the public to comprehend the methods and assumptions involved in doing so) in order to try and get a bigger, magic number than the other guy tells you very little. If you had a billion pounds yet the only thing to spend it on in the entire world was a loaf of bread then you would be in abject poverty in spite of your nominal wealth. The key to encouraging economic progress is increased investment in capital goods such as factories, machines and tools developed with ever better technology, which permits more consumer goods to be produced per worker, thus lowering prices and making more things affordable for everyone. The kind of economic system that best incentivises this accumulation is one of strong private property rights, minimal regulation and minimal taxation. GDP figures can be high in spite (or even because) of the fact that these things may be absent, as it is buoyed by monetary inflation and government spending. The relevant question, therefore, is whether the EU is likely to either promote or discourage this kind of environment. Instead of arguing over GDP projections the answer that “Brexiteers” should be giving is that the consolidation of states makes it more likely that property rights will be diminished while taxes and regulations rise. Smaller states do not usually possess within their territories all of the resources they need to build a strong economy. In much the same way as a single household or individual needs to go shopping at the grocers, the butchers, the bakers and so on, so too does an individual state need to go “shopping” in other countries, trading what they have for things they do not have. Burdensome regulations simply discourage this trade, while high taxes and insecure private property rights will deter foreign investment, all of which will seek more favourable markets as a result. Moreover, if the state becomes too onerous it is far easier for citizens of even modest means to leave a small state than it is for them to leave a larger state. Large, consolidated states, on the other hand, usually have access to a wide labour market and a greater number of resources, and are better equipped for a degree of autarchy. Moreover, the large state’s sheer, geographical size makes it more difficult for a citizen to emigrate to a similar country which is unaffected by the large state’s diktats. The large state will therefore step up its plundering of the citizenry as it is shorn of any real impetus to cease doing so. What produces trade and economic progress, therefore, is not consolidating states into one giant monopoly, which has a reduced incentive to relax its depredations upon its citizens. Rather, it is allowing states to compete with each other to attract entrepreneurial migrants, investment and trade. In other words, while creating a trading block may give the appearance of vanquishing border controls, tariffs and other trade restrictions it does not stop the trading block from imposing internal taxes and regulations that are more burdensome to trade and prosperity than those between independent states. Indeed, a high rate of internally imposed Value Added Tax (VAT) can be worse than a tariff. And, as the “Bremainers” trumpet, while it is true that within a single market companies no longer have to deal with a myriad of different tax rules, different regulatory codes, and so on, it is likely to prove less costly in the long run to deal with many light and fleeting taxes and regulations than it is to deal with one behemoth. Just to give an idea of how big and bloated the EU bureaucracy is, one source (Brexit: The Movie) lists a whole host of household items one encounters between waking up in the morning and eating breakfast:

  • There are 109 regulations for pillows, and 50 for duvets and bed sheets;
  • 65 EU laws cover bathrooms;
  • 31 for toothbrushes and 47 for toothpaste;
  • 172 laws for mirrors, for some reason;
  • 91 for showers, 118 for shampoo, and an incredible 454 for towels;
  • At the breakfast table, there are 1,246 regulations for bread, 52 for toasters, 64 for fridges, 99 for cereal bowls, 201 for spoons, and 625 for coffee;
  • Far ahead, however, is milk which has been deemed to deserve an incredible 12,653 EU regulations.

None of this is to imply, of course, that a world without the EU would be wholly unregulated. Rather, regulation will come from the market place and it is consumers who will decide whether products should meet certain standards. Moreover, increased quality and better safety comes about through the wealth creating endeavours of free individuals so that these things become more affordable, not through the wealth distributing fiat of faceless bureaucrats in Brussels.

Concerning specifically the issue of trade is the argument over whether Britain would, outside of the EU, be able to negotiate so-called “trade deals” without the backing of the EU. In his final visit to the UK as President of the United States, Barack Obama indicated that Britain would be “at the back of the queue” for trade deals owing to what is presumed to be its diminished influence outside of the EU (although this attitude did not stop him, in the same trip, from preaching to an audience of young gullibles an instruction that they should “reject pessimism and cynicism”). The response of “Brexiteers” has been to try and demonstrate how trade agreements would, in fact, be possible and how Britain would open itself up to being able to deal with other large markets, such as China and India, independently. While the latter is certainly true, all of this is wide of the mark. For trade agreements between states are precisely what we wish to avoid. Trade agreements do not open up trade at all; rather they stifle it. Genuine free trade can be accomplished by adhering to a single principle that can be written in a single, short sentence: no restriction of trade across borders. Trade agreements, however, which frequently masquerade as free trade agreements, are simply government managed trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for instance, runs to more than 1,200 pages across two volumes of government imposed rules and regulations, usually in order to grant protectionist privilege to a handful of powerful firms and interests. Indeed, one of the motivations for “Brexit” is for Britain to avoid the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, which is seen as giving too much power to overseas corporations and ignoring environmental concerns. However, “Brexiteers” do not augment this rejection of a specific trade agreement to a rejection of trade agreements as a whole. One possible retort to this argument is that, in the absence of any kind of trade agreement, other countries could simply whack enormous tariffs and regulatory burdens on imported British goods, almost like some kind of punishment. In the first place it is, of course, far-fetched to believe that every one, or even most, of the significant markets with which British companies trade would do this. If a state shuts off or otherwise burdens trade from another state it ultimately harms itself as much as it harms the state upon which it has imposed the restriction. For if, prior to the elevated tariffs or increased regulations, certain resources or products were purchased from Britain it is because Britain produced these products at the best value compared to anyone else. Therefore, after the restrictions, the citizens of the other state must now pay more to produce the same goods internally or buy them from an alternative state, or must be content to purchase goods of lesser quality. Moreover, shutting off imports weakens a demand for a state’s exports as ultimately all imports are paid for with exports. It would, therefore, be foolish for states to respond to a “Brexit” in this way. The same argument applies to the EU itself. Another of the arguments from the “Bremainers” is that if Britain left then the EU would still be Britain’s largest trading partners with the power to impose its regulations on trade entering the block, in addition to newly imposed tariffs. Britain would be shorn of any influence whatsoever to change these rules, and would end up in much the same condition as some of the proximate outliers such as Switzerland and Norway are alleged to languish (never mind, of course, that GDP per capita in those countries is markedly higher than in every EU country). In the first place this argument shows just how few clothes the emperor is wearing. On the one hand, the EU is supposed to be committed to promoting trade and commerce yet on the other hand, if you dare to leave it, you will be shut out by tariff walls and have to suffer whatever burdens the EU rains down upon you. Clearly, therefore, the EU is far from being a promoter of peaceful trade and prosperity. Rather, it is really nothing more than a protectionist club, like a gang of bullies in the school yard who look after each other yet terrorise the other kids. That aside, however, Britain’s “influence” does not come from its membership of the EU – rather, it comes from the value that the EU places on its partnership with Britain, which will ultimately boil down to Britain’s economic clout. If trade with Britain is valuable to the EU then Britain will have as much real influence outside of the club as it does inside; you do not stop talking to someone you need simply because you are not in a political union with them. If, on the other hand, Britain was a tiny, unproductive state that produced little then it would be ignored as a member of the EU just as it would be largely ignored as outside. That is why the larger, more prosperous states in the EU, such as France and Germany have most of the influence. Most of the arguments concerning the loss of any “influence” for Britain, both within the EU and on the so-called “world stage”, do not refer to the diminished influence that the average British citizen would have in improving his life and furthering his goals. Rather, it refers to the diminished influence that the British politician will wield following “Brexit”. Being a representative of a large territory such as the EU gives the state’s lackeys a much more prominent position at the table when they jet off, at taxpayers’ expense, to their plush conferences and summits to devise an ever increasing number of predatory ways in which they can burden the real wealth creators. In any case, however, the “loss of influence” argument seems to have received the final nail in its coffin in early May when it was alleged that Germany had a de facto veto over Prime Minister David Cameron’s renegotiation of Britain’s terms of EU membership. However, even if we imagined the worst case scenario where all of the countries of the world, including the EU, imposed punitively high tariffs and onerous regulations on British imports and refused to engage with Britain in any way shape or form, the latter would still benefit from making a universal declaration of free trade – no tariffs on imported goods and little or no regulation. This sudden reduction in cost would then make Britain a highly competitive market, reducing costs of inputs for British businesses, attracting investment, expanding output and lowering prices for British consumers.

Looking more broadly, what are we to make of the argument that the EU was the supposed solution to centuries of war and human rights abuses? Strictly speaking, the human rights obligations of European states depend not so much upon the EU but, rather, upon whether they sign up to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which dates from 1953. The Convention is used as a convenient short hand for states to demonstrate their commitment to human rights, which is a condition of EU membership, and jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights normally plays an important role in determining how member states should implement EU law in accordance with their human rights obligations. Nevertheless, even though, as libertarians, we must be suspicious of any kind of government implemented human rights charter, which simply cherry picks certain pleasantries, subjects them to state regulation, and calls them “rights”, it would be possible for a member state of the EU to leave and still remain a party to the ECHR. Somewhat perversely it is, in fact, prominent “Bremainers”, such as Home Secretary Theresa May, who are campaigning for Britain to withdraw from the ECHR while remaining in the EU. The possibility of war however, is an important issue, with Mr Cameron himself having argued that leaving the EU would increase the risk of Europe descending into war. In the first place we have to wonder why, if the situation was that grave, Mr Cameron’s commitment to the EU was so ambiguous before he achieved his so-called “reform deal”, which renegotiated Britain’s EU obligations in areas such as welfare and immigration. Prior to this he supposedly had no “emotional attachment” to the EU and at least gave the impression that he may campaign to leave if the reforms failed. Mr Cameron was effectively saying that if he was devoid of an “emotional attachment” to the EU he was also devoid of an “emotional attachment” to avoiding war, the latter of which is surely more important than tweaking the conditions of EU membership. That aside, however, we have to wonder what this argument – the possibility of European war – makes of the so-called “democratic peace theory”. This is the idea that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, and is peddled by pretty much the same people who crow for political unity. Weren’t the continent’s wars started by despotic monarchs and crackpot dictators? Surely now that we all bask in the bliss of democracy we won’t be so eager to fight each other? Why do we need something more? Regardless of this, however, the argument that a diminution of the EU will lead to war is ridiculous – indeed, it is the opposite that is more likely. Wars are started and fought by states; human rights are abused by states; the state, in the twentieth century alone, caused more deaths than private criminals in the whole of human history. Even the greatest efforts of sub-state, politically motivated actors – i.e. “terrorists” – pale in comparison to the carnage and destruction wrought by states. If this is true, it stands to reason that the solution to preventing this is to make states smaller and weaker, not bigger and stronger. The most destructive, and most potentially destructive conflicts we have ever experienced – the two world wars and the Cold War – occurred after the consolidation of smaller states into large territories, namely Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. The origins of both of the world wars is complex, of course, but a fundamental cause was the drive of the unified Germany towards autarchy. As an industrialised country, Germany relied upon the import of food and the export of manufactured products in order to pay for it. The costs and burdens heaped upon German industry in order to fund the Bismarckian welfare state hampered German production, leading to fewer exports and fewer imports of food. Thus Germany looked to conquer the agrarian lands of Eastern Europe to overcome this self-inflicted handicap. What is clear, however, is that this problem was facilitated by the unified state, which was endowed with the wherewithal to grow the depredations of the state upon its industry and the might to launch invasions. Later, the persistent nuclear terror that was extant during the Cold War was made possible because territories as large and as rich as the United States and the Soviet Union could afford to fund things such as the Manhattan Project. The most aggressive and belligerent state today is the United States, which, together with its fawning collection of NATO allies, is driven by the neoconservative foreign policy agenda that seeks a unipolar world of American dominance. The greatest threat to peace is that such ambitions emanating from a large, rich and powerful state run head first into the ambitions of other large, rich and powerful states – namely, China and Russia, as we are seeing lately with the expansion of NATO to Russia’s border, the demonization of the Russian president and the altercations in the South China Sea. The worst case scenario is that the world will be vaporised in a nuclear holocaust, something which is likely to get worse if the next US President, who will be elected in November of this year, continues down this path. It is clear therefore that the consolidation of states may reduce the number of potential warmongers – but the stakes are far, far bigger. The key to achieving peace and prosperity is free trade in a sound money environment. You do not have to point a gun at your butcher or your baker in order for him to hand over what you want; you simply have to offer him something that he wants and then you both get on with the rest of your day. Exactly the same is true on a global scale; individuals engaging in voluntary exchange without interference across borders will not fight each other. War and conflict result only when states infringe this harmony.

This leads us on to the so-called “democratic deficit” argument – the idea that the EU’s governance and institutions somehow lack democratic legitimacy. It is true that if the EU is perceived as beyond the control of the voters then tolerance for it will dissipate quicker than if they believe they are “having their say”. On the other hand, however, democratic legitimacy is something of a red herring. People possess a de facto control over the state, with or without democracy, the smaller and more local it is. Even if the EU reformed all of its institutions in order to eradicate the “democratic deficit”, the EU would remain as a vast territory in which the individual voter vanishes into an ocean of 500 million others and its institutions would still amount to a vast bureaucracy awash with special interests that speak umpteen foreign languages making it impossible for the voter of any individual country to understand precisely what is going on. This can point can be made without us having to resort to the wider libertarian critique of democracy as an enabler of, rather than a restriction upon the state.

In drawing all of what we have said together, we will conclude with an observation that is likely to resonate with libertarians. When it comes to the big issues such as economic progress, trade, and promoting peace and prosperity, all of the arguments in favour of the EU boil down to the assertion that the EU makes it easier to get rid of state imposed restrictions and to vanquish ills that are created by the state. In other words, the EU is supposed to be good not because it actually achieves a positive accomplishment over the restrictions imposed upon humans by nature (such as a new product or service), but because it clears away artificial roadblocks that states have put in the way. If this is true, perhaps it would be better to address the question of whether we need the state at all, rather than whether we need a giant one such as the EU.

Economic Myths #7 – Government means Harmony

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One of the aspects of capitalism and the free market that the typical lay person finds difficult to comprehend is the fact that the complex structure of work, production, distribution, and trade could possibly take place without some kind of centralised, directing authority in order to co-ordinate everybody’s efforts. Wouldn’t there just be chaos and mal-coordination with everyone trying to make their own, independent plans with no government tiller to steer the giant ship?

This fallacy stems from the belief – accentuated by holistic concepts such aggregate statistics and, indeed, national identities – that “the economy” is some kind of enormous machine that has “input” and requires one operator to “process” the “inputs” into “outputs”. In fact, rather than being one giant, amorphous blob “the economy” is made up of millions and millions of independent unilateral acts of production and two-way trades, many of which will never have anything to do with each other. Indeed, I may sell an apple to my neighbour for 10p in London; another person may sell an orange for 20p to his neighbour in Manchester. Neither of the two pairs of people has ever met, nor need any of them have anything to do with the exchange of the other pair; and yet both exchanges would be regarded as part of “the British economy” in mainstream discourse. Rather than being a top-down operated machine, the economy is a bottom up network of independent transactions – motivated by the ends desired by each and every one of us rather than a bureaucrat – joined only together through the communication of the price system. All of the trades together, stimulated by varying and changing desires and ends that people seek, will have a constant and unceasing influence on the prices that regulate the supply of goods relative to their demand. Ironically, it is precisely because of such complexity that the attempts of any central authority to control and direct it are nothing short of futile – as Ludwig von Mises proved as long ago as the birth of the world’s greatest collectivist experiment, the Soviet Union, in Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.

An oft-heard complaint, particularly from the left, is that “globalisation” and expanding markets has led to a decimation of the local culture and community. All this means, however, is that the market for goods has simply expanded so that one can source one’s needs from pretty much anywhere on the globe. It is still the case that the driving force of demand is not global or holistic – it resides very locally in every individual person’s tastes and desires. Such complaints therefore fail to recognise the irony in calling for a very distant and hardly local entity – the government – to halt globalisation and expanding markets by replacing what individual, local people desire with its own ends.

This myth, of course, goes further than economics and has more than seeped into philosophy as well, stemming from a basic misunderstanding about what is required for the human race to live in peace and harmony. It does not mean that we all need to be pursuing the same ends, following the same plan or singing from the same hymn sheet and we do not need some centralising authority to prevent “discordance” between the actions of one person and another. Rather, what is required is that we can each follow our own plans while not conflicting with the plans of others. This is precisely what private property and the free exchange accomplish. Recognising that all conflicts have their origin in the contest over physical goods, an exclusive right is granted to the first user-producer (or to the recipient of the good in a voluntary exchange) so that he may fulfil his ends without molestation from other people; and other people can use the goods for which they are the first producer-user without interference from him. Any person arguing in favour of “one direction” and “harmony” at the behest of centralised control really means that everyone else’s plans should be overridden by his own – and should be forced to accept them. Indeed every forced, government transaction requires there to be at least one loser, one person who does not want his funds directed to the ends desired by government. Rather than producing harmony what results is merely bitterness and antagonism. Furthermore, aside from the economic chaos that such a system brings, rather than inspiring such qualities as productivity, self-reliance, hard work, prudence, patience and responsibility, the resulting social disorder instils, in their stead, laziness, apathy, conflict, corruption, impatience and cynicism – hardly the human qualities that one would wish to exemplify as the hallmarks of a “peaceful” and “harmonious” society.

True harmony can only be brought about by allowing each and every individual to pursue his own ends with the scarce resources over which he has lawful ownership, while allowing everyone else to do the same – permitting the human race to flourish peacefully and devoid of conflict. Not only does government fail to aid this process, it is the active cause of its destruction – and the sooner we recognise this the closer we will be to building a lasting peace and prosperity.

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Land and Natural Resources Part Two – Trade and Exchange

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In part one of this two-part series of essays we explored the utility, value, profits and losses that are associated with a single human’s action in relation to land and natural resources. In this second part we will now turn to a consideration of the same in a world where there are multiple humans and the economy is a complex one of trade and exchange of these resources.

Land Settlement in the Complex Economy

Where we have a world of many humans each of them are, at birth, in the same position as our lone human at his birth. They are gifted their own bodies, their standing room and a set of free goods that they do not need to make the object of their action in order to derive utility from. Every action thereafter will be taken at a cost with the object of receiving a gain that will outweigh that cost. To reiterate again these costs and gains must be estimated in advance and so every action is only speculative; there is no certainty that an action will, in fact, yield a gain. In a world of trade and exchange land and its product will trade for money and so these gains and costs will, likewise, be estimated not in terms of land’s physical product but in terms of the money that they will fetch in exchange. Now, therefore, leaving aside mental appreciations such as aesthetics or personal value attached to specific areas of land such as one’s home, we are not talking about merely psychic profits and losses but the actual revenue and outflow of money from operations with natural resources. In other words, how can one make money from using natural resources and how can we categorise the components of this income?

The first, if seemingly trite, observation concerning an unsettled plot of land is that no one has estimated the land as being valuable. In other words no one yet believes that the revenue to be gained from settling this land will outweigh the cost of doing so. Existing settlements or other prospects are deemed to be more valuable than settling the plot in question. The prices of the scarce resources that will be devoted towards settling the plot are being bid up by other potential uses and people estimate that the yield from the land will not be sufficient to cover these costs. Where, therefore, one human decides to settle land it will be because he, uniquely, decides that this land will, in fact, yield a definite gain and that everyone else is in error in leaving the land fallow. Let us again take the example of Plot A, demonstrating now the gains and costs not in terms of physical product but in terms of money. There are only three possibilities:

  1. Plot A will make a profit;
  2. Plot A will break even;
  3. Plot A will make a loss.

Let us examine each of these possibilities in turn, assuming again that the prevailing rate of interest will apply a 10% discount to the gross yield in each year. In scenario 1, we will take the gross yield to be £200K per year with the costs amounting to £100K per year. We can illustrate the net gain as follows in Figure A:

Figure A

Year      Gross Yield        Costs                Gross Gain        (Discount)          Net

1          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£10K)              £90K

2          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£20K)              £80K

3          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£30K)              £70K

4          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£40K)              £60K

5          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£50K)              £50K

6          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£60K)              £40K

7          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£70K)              £30K

8          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£80K)              £20K

9          £200K               £100K               £100K               (£90K)              £10K

10         £200K               £100K               £100K               (£100K)            £0K

The result of this has been a net profit for the land settlor. The land has actually turned out to yield more monetary income than was estimated by everyone else. In other words, everybody else was incorrect in estimating that the land would not produce an end that is more highly valued than some alternative. Rather, the product of the land is more highly valued than other ends to which the scarce factors of production could have been allocated and this value will be imputed back to the land itself so we can say that the land will have a capitalised value equal to the sum of the final column which, in this instance, is £450K. We will return to this again shortly but before that we shall examine scenarios two and three. In the former, it should be obvious that there will be no net gain at all. Let us illustrate this by assuming that the land will still yield £200K per year but now costs have risen to an equal amount:

Figure B

Year      Gross Yield        Costs                Gross Gain        (Discount)          Net

1          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

2          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

3          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

4          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

5          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

6          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

7          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

8          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

9          £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)                £0K

10         £200K               £200K               £0K                   (£0K)               £0K

In this instance what is produced is exactly what is paid out in costs and there was, therefore, absolutely no point in settling the land. While there has not been a loss and the settlor is not in any worse position than he was before, there has also been no gain and the entire operation has been pointless. What about scenario three? Now let’s assume that costs remain at £200K but that now the land only yields £100K of gross income:

Figure C

Year      Gross Yield        Costs                Gross Gain        (Discount)          Net

1          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £10K                 (£90K)

2          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £20K                 (£80K)

3          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £30K                 (£70K)

4          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £40K                 (£60K)

5          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £50K                 (£50K)

6          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £60K                 (£40K)

7          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £70K                 (£30K)

8          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £80K                 (£20K)

9          £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £90K                 (£10K)

10         £100K               £200K               (£100K)             £100K              (£0K)

Here the settlement was entirely erroneous and will result in year after year of net losses for the settlor. He estimated incorrectly that the yield from the land would be sufficient to cover the costs and, in fact, there were more valuable uses to which these costs could have been devoted. The entire operation has been a waste and the land will simply be abandoned1.

Let us now turn back to scenario one where the land yielded a profit. We noted that the settlor realises a gain upon the realisation that the land will produce a yield the value of which exceeds that of its costs. Once again, as in part one, we must emphasise that this gain is earned not by the “productivity of the land” or its “natural powers”. The land was only doing that which it is under the orders of the laws of physics to do. Rather the earnings, the net income, are wholly the reward of the decision of the settlor to turn that land into productive use, a decision that resulted from his judgment that the land would yield more than its costs, an outcome that was, furthermore, clouded with uncertainty. Everyone else was free to make the same decision and to settle the land first but nobody did. To the extent, therefore, that a person earns a net income from productive use on the land it is only because this person, uniquely, has realised that devoting scarce resources to its settlement and use will yield a stream of utility that is more valuable to consumers than that which existed before. It was his decision that created the increase in value with the resulting flow of productive services, and it is to this aspect that the net income flows.

If this is doubted then we should consider the situation of the evenly rotating economy where all revenues equal cost. In other words there is trade and activity but all the utility of what is received from an action equals exactly the utility of that which is foregone. So if the produce of land yields £200K per year then the landowner will have to pay precisely £200K per year in costs2. If this was the way the world worked then it should be clear that there is no room at all for uncertainty and for decision making. If it is certain that there is no realisation of value, that nothing could ever be made better, then there is no premium to be put on the making of judgments that results in decisions. Net income disappears precisely because there is no need for these aspects. It is only because we live in a world where things can be made better and that this betterment is shrouded in uncertainty that a judgment must be exercised in order to realise it. Good judgments that direct the scarce resources available to a stream of utility that is more preferable than that given up are rewarded with net income. Bad judgments which waste those resources on ends that are not preferred are penalised with losses.

What about, for the sake of completion, a world where things could be made better but that the improvement is certain? That if we made a decision we would know for sure that the outcome would exactly be as intended so that, in other words, everyone’s judgment would exactly predict what would happen. If this was so then everyone’s judgment and everyone’s decisions would be exactly the same. A person can only profit from a decision because everyone else has underestimated the value of the yield from a productive activity, this underestimation resulting in an underbidding for the productive resources that are devoted to that activity. If, however, everyone knew the outcome then there would be no underbidding at all and all costs of production would be bid up fully to the height of the revenue of the resulting product. Hence, there would be no net income.

Therefore our conclusion can only be that the realisation of value is a product of superior human judgment.

Going back to our landowner does he now realise a constant, year on year net income from his ownership of the land? Unfortunately for him he does not. For the £450K worth of net income, representing the capitalised value of the land, is was he earns now and correspondingly takes its place in his rank of values now. It must therefore be ranked alongside other actions which could be more or less valuable now and while he hangs onto the land he always bears the opportunity cost of foregoing other actions. In the case of our lone human in part one this was the result of having to decide whether to continue to produce on the current plot of land or whether to stop and move to an alternative piece of land. In the complex economy, however, the decision that must constantly be assessed and remade is whether to hang onto the land or to sell it to a purchaser. Let us examine the ramifications of this necessity.

Trade of Land

In the first place, let us assume that the net present value of the land – £450K – is not only correct but that also all entrepreneurs know that it is correct and that this is certain. In other words the precise yields from and costs of production on the land are as they are in Figure A above and everyone knows that there will be no deviation from this schedule. What this means is that the purchase price will be bid up to exactly this net present value – £450K – with all potential suitors offering not a penny more and not a penny less. The decision for the landowner is a very simple one – to carry on with production of the land and wait for the fruits of its productivity; or to sell and to accept the present value of this future yield now in cash. The result of this is to impose upon our landowner an opportunity cost that completely wipes out any continuing net gains in income. As he can take the present value of the yield in cash the foregoing of this opportunity through holding onto the land will leave him only with interest from the future yields, i.e. the difference in value of the future yields when they mature and the capitalised value of the land now.

In reality, however, the situation is much different. Rather than everyone knowing the future yields of land they constantly have to be estimated. As we said in part one there are at least four factors that affect this:

a)     Direct costs of farming a plot will change from year after year and must be estimated in advance of their occurrence;

b)     Opportunity costs will change from year after year and, likewise, must be estimated;

c)      The gross yield of a plot of land is not certain in advance; rather, factors such as the weather, seed quality and soil deterioration will intervene;

d)     The discount to be applied to future gains is dependent upon the individual’s time preference rate which is subject to change.

To this we may add one more:

e)     The precise end to which the land is devoted also has to be decided. Should it be used for farming, for the building of a factory, or for building houses? Which of these streams of utility is most valuable to the customers who will provide the revenue?

Every entrepreneur, therefore, including the present land owner must constantly assess and estimate the effect on the productivity of the land by these aspects and this list is not necessarily exhaustive. Having estimated the future yield, each entrepreneur will discount it to a net present value resulting in a price that he is willing to pay for the land now3. Let us look at the mechanics of this fact in situations that lead to a profitable outcome for our landowner. Let’s say that there are three entrepreneurs, A, B and C, of whom our current landowner is entrepreneur A. Each engages in his estimation and calculates the following net present values of the land:

A        £450K

B        £350K

C        £250K

In this instance every other entrepreneur estimates the net present value of the land as being lower than the estimate of A. As A estimates that there is more to be gained from holding onto the land and selling its produce at a later period in time than from selling the land now then he will refuse to sell the land to the highest bidder which is B. If A is correct and the land yields a produce that is more than the estimate of the next highest bidding entrepreneur (let’s say that A’s estimate is precisely correct) then what is the analysis of A’s income? As his opportunity cost was to sell the land for £350K and earn interest on this sum, his actual outcome has been to hold onto the land and earn interest on a sum of £450K. The difference between these two will therefore form a net income – an income that A received solely because he estimated the produce of the land as being higher than that of rival entrepreneurs. Examining each of our criteria a) through to e) above he could have done this a number of ways and, in practice, a combination of them will always be active:

a)     A more accurately estimated the costs of farming the land as being lower than the estimates of B or C; or the methods that A chose in farming the land were less costly than those that B or C would have employed. A’s economy therefore conserved scarce resources to be released for employment towards the fulfilment of other ends.

b)     A accurately estimated that the other opportunities available to him would yield a lower (if any) net income than holding onto the land;

c)      A more accurately predicted the conditions of farming than B or C; the latter might have erroneously predicted more unfavourable farming conditions which led to their lower estimates;

d)     This is a little more complex and will be examined when we discuss land hoarding and speculation (below). Suffice it to say that A may have more accurately estimated the future societal rate of time preference than B or C and hence the discount to be applied to the future yields;

e)     And finally, A might have devoted the land to an end that is more valuable in the eyes of consumers than B or C would have done and thus the consumers were willing to pay a higher amount for its produce than for the produce that B or C might have churned out from the same land4.

Let us say that having witnessed A’s burst of productivity, B and C revise their estimations of the land’s capabilities. For argument’s sake, A maintains his estimate at the previous level:

A        £450K

B        £550K

C        £350K

Here what should be clear is that A now has the opportunity to sell the land for a net present value that is greater than his estimate of the same. He believes that B has overestimated its productivity and will incur a loss if he purchases for that sum. A therefore cashes in by selling to B and earns interest on the sum of £550K. To his horror, however, B finds that the land only yields a present value of £450K and hence he earns interest on this lower sum. It would have been better for B to have foregone the purchase and held onto the cash, earning interest on £550K instead of £450K. The difference between these two therefore represents B’s loss and A’s profit. The loss of B has accrued to a bad decision, a decision to devote the scarce resources available to an end that was less productive than that estimated. The reader can examine our criteria a) – e) above in order to speculate upon the source of B’s error, but the important point is this: where there is a net income it results from diverting the scarce resources to an end more highly valued than that estimated by other entrepreneurs. A loss is made when resources are devoted to an end that is less highly valued than that estimated by the same. Good decisions and beneficial use of scarce resources therefore yield a reward – a net income, a profit. Bad decisions and the waste of resources are punished with losses. Net income therefore flows to good decision-making ability and it is this ability alone – not any productive power of the land or any virtue of its ownership – that commands a premium in the marketplace5.

Now we shall turn to situations in which A’s decisions make a loss. Let us return to the first set of estimations:

A        £450K

B        £350K

C        £250K

A, obviously, will again choose to hold onto the land. But let’s say that in this scenario the land only yields £300K’s worth of income. It would have been better to have sold to B and made a presently valued profit of £50K rather than hold onto to the land and lose that opportunity. A’s decision was erroneous and this error was met with a loss. What about the second set of valuations?

A        £450K

B        £550K

C        £350K

Again A will sell to B in this scenario. A thinks that B is a fool in this scenario for thinking that he (B) can ever ring out £550K’s worth of productivity from the land and A congratulates himself for having made a handsome profit. But what if the land actually yields a presently valued income of £650K? In this instance, therefore, it would have been better for A to have held onto the land and carried on production. Instead he sold it and the passing up of this opportunity imposes a loss upon him.

What we realise, therefore, is that all present and prospective landowners constantly bear the burden of having to assess the future income from land. Present landowners have to determine whether the future income will outweigh the purchase prices offered by prospective buyers. The latter have to determine whether they can offer a purchase price that is outweighed by the future income. Those that make the most accurate decisions in this challenge are those that devote the scarce resources available to their most highly valued ends. They took the decision to direct their resources in this way in the face of uncertainty while nobody else did. The result is a net profit.

We should also add here that good decisions and good decision-making ability are determined relatively not absolutely – the profitable entrepreneur only has to be more accurate than the next entrepreneur. For example, let’s say that the land would yield a net present income of £650K and the following entrepreneurs estimate it as follows:

A        £450K

B        £350K

C        £250K

In this case it is obvious that A will hold onto the land and earn a net income when the yield of the land turns out to be worth a present value of £650K. But what if the estimations were as follows?

A        £450K (same as before)

B        £550K

C        £250K (same as before)

Here A will make the choice to sell to B. Yet even though his choice was derived from the same estimation as in the previous scenario, he now incurs a loss as it would have been better for him to have held onto the land and earn interest on £650K than to have taken £550K in cash. Looking at that same scenario from the buyer’s perspective, B now earns the profit. But what if there was a third set of valuations as follows?

A        £450K (same as before)

B        £550K (same as before)

C        £600K

Now, the profit maker is C. Therefore, even though the judgments that underpinned the decisions of A and B remained constant, the entry of a more accurate entrepreneur meant that the latter earned the profit and they did not. It is, therefore, the most relatively accurate decision in directing scarce resources to their ends that is rewarded. Clearly the same will also be true from the loss-maker’s point of view – a judgment that once was loss-making will become profitable if other entrepreneurs lose their accurate foresight.

Profit, therefore, can only be made when a person renders a valuable service that no one else is able to do. If entrepreneurial foresight becomes more prevalent and accurate its supply increases and, just like any other good, as supply increases then, all else being equal, the price it can command must diminish. If a piece of land yields £650K per year and the most accurate prospective purchaser bids £450K for it that he will earn a net present income of £200K. If, however, the market is suddenly flooded with entrepreneurial talent then each entrepreneur will bid up the land successively towards its mark of £650K. If an entrepreneur would bid £630K for the land then there is a chance for another, more accurate one, to bid, say, £640K. But the entry of a further, still more accurate entrepreneur could raise the purchase price to £645K with profit diminishing to a mere £5K. The extension of this situation would obviously be where every entrepreneur values the land exactly correctly and everyone would bid precisely £650K for it, with any chance of net income disappearing entirely. The existence of net income is therefore negatively correlated with the prevalence of good decision-making ability and as soon as the latter is abundant it ceases to command a high premium and profit comes close to disappearing.

In part one we questioned whether it was possible for luck to influence a person’s net gain. Could, for example, one buy or sell a piece of land having absolutely no idea whether it will yield a net income ahead of the purchase price? Or, alternatively, could one sell a piece of land without a single clue as to whether he is selling it for more than it is worth? In other words couldn’t someone just yield a profit by gambling rather than through any special entrepreneurial talent? If one makes a net income on these occasions then it states one of two things. First, as we said in part one, to consign one’s fate to luck is itself a decision and to the extent that it is more profitable than a carefully considered decision then it is the best decision. Secondly, if one makes a profit from gambling then it is still the case that resources were directed to an end that was more highly valued by consumers than that estimated by other entrepreneurs. In short, the gambler’s guess was better than anyone else’s decision and in its absence the economy would be worse off. It is the realisation of value that is rewarded, whatever the method through which it is achieved. It is just that in our world luck plays a very minor role in reaching this goal whereas good decision-making ability is most often needed.

Speculation and Hoarding

With all of this in mind let us now turn our attention to the speculation and hoarding of land. Land owners are often accused of sitting on fallow land and earning year on year profits while this land could be used for the fulfilment of vitally needed ends6. Can we square these facts?

The first question we have to address is why does fallow land have any capitalised value at all? If it isn’t being used for anything then how is it generating any value whatsoever? The answer to this can only be that, in the estimations of entrepreneurs, the land will not yield any valuable utility from a stream of production now but will, rather, yield the same from production that is begun in the future. Say, for example, that if entrepreneurs estimate that additional housing capacity is not required now but will be required in, say, ten years then the land’s ability to meet this end at that point in the future will be imputed back to the land itself and it will trade for a capitalised value. Obviously the discount applied to a utility only taking effect at such a far off point will impose a cumulatively heavy toll, but there would still be a capitalised value. Entrepreneurs therefore have to decide not only what to devote land towards but precisely when to do it and it is the differences of these estimations that permit one to earn a net income from the hoarding of land.

Let us say that A purchases a plot of land now with the intention to hold onto it without development and is able to earn a net income on this operation. There are two aspects to the explanation of this outcome. First, if all entrepreneurs are agreed as to when is the most suitable time to develop the land is then A can only make a profit if he more accurately estimates the value of the yields that result once this time is reached and the land is developed. This is essentially no different from what we discussed above – the only difference is that the first act of production will not be now but at some point in the future. But secondly, if entrepreneurs are not in agreement over when the most suitable time to develop the land is then A can make a profit by more accurately estimating this suitable time. Let’s say, for example, that the five entrepreneurs would develop the land after the respective intervals have elapsed following purchase and their estimations of the present value of the yields are as follows. Let us also assume, for simplicity’s sake, that each is correct in the estimation of what the land would yield after these intervals:

A        5 years         £600K

B        4 years         £500K

C        3 years         £450K

D        2 years         £210K

E        1 year           £130K

What this means is that E believes that the most productive use of the land will arrive after only one year and that he won’t, therefore, gain more than a present value of £130K by waiting either longer or shorter. D believes that two years is the correct period to wait and any longer or shorter will never achieve as high an income as £210K, presently valued. And so on for C, B and A. The latter, however, is the most accurate and he is the one who will purchase the land (in this case, offering only slightly more than the discounted value of B’s estimate in order to price B out of the market) and he will earn a profit. The effect of A’s action is to withhold the land from development that would otherwise occur too early and thus its direction to an end that is less valuable to consumers is prevented; rather the land is released for development right at the precise time when it is needed for fulfilling the most pressing end. A of course might be “incorrect” in an absolute sense – perhaps had he waited another year still (so six years in total) the land might have yielded a present value of £700K. But as the relatively most accurate entrepreneur he is the one who yielded the profit. Had another person, F, come along and bid £650K then A would not have earned that profit.

Related to this is the height of the societal time preference rate which determines the interest rate. As we said earlier, all future utility from land is discounted according to the prevailing rate of interest. But this too is subject to fluctuation and must be estimated, a point we noted earlier. If time preference lowers then the discount to be applied to future yields of land will diminish and hence the capitalised value of land will rise. On the other hand if time preference rises then the discount will be increased and the capitalised value of land will fall, its promise of future utility being less valuable to consumers. In practice this phenomenon tends to go hand in hand with the fact that land may yield its most valuable end not now but sometime in the future. For land is the ultimate remote good out of which capital goods must be furnished and increased demand for it is almost synonymous with a lowering of the societal time preference rate and a desire to engage in more roundabout methods of production and the creation of economic growth. The estimation, therefore, by entrepreneurs that land will yield a more valuable use not now but in the future also translates into estimating that the societal rate of time preference will be lower.

The allocation of resources across time is also one of the most difficult activities which must be faced by the present landowner, let alone a prospective purchaser. A failure to estimate how much to produce and when to do so has the potential to cause serious losses. The capitalised value of a copper mine, for example, will, as we know, represent the discounted value of all of the future copper that will be extracted from that mine. The choice of how much copper to mine this year is made not only in the face of current costs such as labour, equipment etc. but also the mine owner must consider the fact that any extraction of copper now will mean that there is less copper to be had in the future. If the mine owner extracts copper now then this will cause a write down in the capitalised value of the land as, the copper having been extracted, a portion of it is no longer there to provide for future utility. Whether or not the mine owner successfully allocates copper to the present or to the future depends on the relationship of the revenue from selling copper now on the one hand to the height of the write down on the other. If, having accounted for all other costs, the revenue he receives from selling a portion of the copper today is higher than the write down then this means that the present value of copper sold has a higher value than the same copper would have done had it been left under the ground. Therefore the quantity of copper that the mine owner brought to market was in line with the preferences of consumers and copper was not wasted by being mined too soon. On the other hand, if the value of the write down is higher than the revenue that is received then this means that the copper that is brought to market would have had a higher present value had it been left under the ground to be preserved for a future use. The copper was brought to market and supplied too early and consumers were not willing to devote it to an end today that is more valuable than an end at some point in the future. In short, the copper has been wasted and the resulting loss will penalise the mine owner for this oversight. It is for this reason why capitalism and free exchange provides the best method of conserving resources as the profit and loss system entices entrepreneurs to deploy them precisely when they can meet their most valuable ends.

Taxation of Land

It follows from the analysis in both parts of this series of essays that any attempt by the government to tax the proceeds from land must fall upon one of the three streams of income:

  1. Costs;
  2. Interest;
  3. Entrepreneurial Profit and Loss.

If costs are the target then clearly this just raises the cost per unit of productivity from the land. Within this category will fall all taxes on labour, direct taxes on the costs such as sales taxes, and the taxes that must be borne by suppliers. If, though, interest is the target then this has the effect of increasing the discount from future yields of land. The relative attractiveness of future goods will therefore decline and so too will any engagement in roundabout methods of production that lead to economic growth. Finally, a tax on entrepreneurial profit and loss will penalise the decision-making ability that directs resources to their most highly valued ends. There will, therefore be relatively less inclination to seek out the most valuable ends coupled with relatively more wasting of land as the lack of scrupulousness means that the land ends up being devoted to less urgent ends7.

All taxation on land will simply magnify the costs and reduce the gains. But it is important to stress its effect on our third category of income above, which relates to the entrepreneurial aspect of land ownership. The purpose of the analysis in these two essays has been to demonstrate that regardless of any natural qualities of the land or resource in question every decision and every action – even just holding onto the land – entails a cost that may outweigh its gain. Net gains from land ownership can only be had by demonstrating a relative entrepreneurial talent. They cannot be gained simply by owning land and sitting on one’s backside – there is no category of “unearned” or free income from land ownership that is ripe for taxation and there is no form of taxation that will be neutral on productivity.

At the beginning of part one, we stated that every action has a cost and a gain, the magnitude of each being uncertain. The only free or unearned “income” that a person ever has is his own body and standing room at the moment that he is born. Not only did we indicate in part one that these cannot be considered as “gains” as such but if one is adamant that unearned income should be taxed away then it follows that the only logical proposal to enact that policy is to tax birth. Is any advocate of the taxation of unearned income expecting to be able to propose such levy and, at the same time, to be taken seriously?


What we have sought to demonstrate in this two part series of essays is how an acting human can realise utility, gains, benefits, profits, losses and value from his actions in relation to land, including its use and its trade. We have concluded that the gross yield is directed to three sources – compensation for costs, interest, and entrepreneurial profit and loss. Finally we concluded that attempt to levy a tax on any one of these must have the effect of raising costs and decreasing gains, leading to a relative wasting of land.

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1Alternatively, if the landowner was locked into the operation and had to suffer the repeated losses, the only way he could escape would be to transfer the land to someone else. But who would want to do this? Who would want to take on the burden of a loss-bearing piece of land? The only way that it could happen is if the current land owner was to compensate the purchaser for the future losses – in other words he would have to pay someone the net present value of each year’s loss, the sum of which is that of the last column in figure C – £450K. The interest earned on this sum will compensate the new landowner for the maturity value of the losses (£100K) as each year comes round. This situation is not unusual if you consider the possibility of an enthusiastic entrepreneur taking on burdensome and lengthy obligations to third parties in relation to the operation on the land.

2In most descriptions of the evenly rotating economy there would still be discounting as the costs are incurred at a period of time before the vending of the final product. Indeed one of the advantages of this imaginary construction is that it is able to explain the phenomenon of interest as being distinct from entrepreneurial profit and loss. If the land yields £200K then, applying a discount rate of 10% per annum, costs that are incurred one year earlier will amount to £180K.

3For the sake of simplicity we will ignore the effects upon price of bartering and assume that each purchaser would pay a purchase price equal to his valuation of the land.

4It might also be the case, of course, that A is simply a more productive labourer than B or C and can farm more produce per acre. But any gain in income from this aspect accrues not to A’s entrepreneurial decision-making ability but rather to the remuneration for his labour and this additional income would be categorised in the “costs” column of an analysis of the gross income from the land rather than in the “net income” column.

5We are not intending the words “good”, “bad”, “reward” and “punishment” to imply any moral evaluation of an entrepreneur’s actions; rather, the terms should be appreciated only to the extent that people prefer making profits to losses.

6The recent accusations of the leader of the UK Labour Party, Ed Miliband, were of precisely that.

7In practice, taxes on interest and profit and loss amount to the same thing as it is not possible to separate them from an accounting point of view.

Capitalism – The Law of the Jungle?

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It is frequently asserted that a system of free market capitalism reduces everyone to the level of animals, subject to the “law of the jungle”. Similar emotive epithets are those such as capitalism being “dog eat dog” or “winner takes all”. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Under a capitalist system all property is privately owned. Therefore, all exchanges are voluntary and not coerced (except, obviously, for acknowledged criminal acts of theft and violence). But for a voluntary exchange to occur then both parties must expect to benefit from the exchange. The exchange has therefore been productive as it has left both parties with something better than what they had before. If they did not expect to be better off then neither would have made the exchange.

Contrast this, however, with Government intervention. Such interventions, such as taxation, are ­non-voluntary, i.e. the taxed individual has no choice as to whether the exchange occurs. But if he would not have made the exchange voluntarily then it follows that he does not regard the post-exchange results as being to his benefit in comparison. Hence while the recipient – Government, or whoever Government distributes the money to – benefits, the forced giver manifestly does not. And as it is not possible to measure utilities between individuals we cannot say that the recipient gains “more” than the tax-payer loses.

Indeed the very essence of capitalism and its ability to lift whole populations out of the slum of poverty is because people produce goods that other people want which they then trade for what they themselves want in return. There is production of new goods that are voluntarily traded to make everyone’s lives better off. It is a plus-sum operation. Taxation and other forms of coerced exchange, however, are fights over existing goods – goods that already have been produced but the Government wades in and decides that someone other than the productive party should have them. This is manifestly a zero-sum game, one party reaping what another loses. And what could be closer to the law of the jungle than this? Animals in the jungle are not productive, they fight with other animals for the restricted goods that nature has offered them so that they may survive. What one animal gains another animal loses. “Dog eat dog” is therefore a more appropriate description of political fights for taxpayers’ money rather than for free exchange.

Finally, “winner takes all” would be a more apt description for democracy than for capitalism. With private property and free exchange the minority does not have to be restricted to the products and services that the majority wants. Most people might decide to shop at the mall but that does not force others to do so and does not stop the latter from spending their pounds or dollars at a boutique. In a Government election, however, the minority – the losers – have to put up with the successful candidate even though they didn’t want him and might find his policies odious. Such a system benefits only the majority – the winners, who take all – at the expense of the hapless losers.

Indeed such epithets as these we have been discussing are usually applied to capitalism by those who do not believe that they have benefited enough from free exchange and to remedy this they want to start taking what other people have, usually in the name of “fairness” and “equality”. Such charlatans should be exposed for what they are honestly trying to do – reduce human civilisation to a very real law of the jungle.

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The Scourge of the Collective


By the far the most significant error with any political, social, economic or philosophical discourse today is that all questions, issues and problems are posed by starting not from the individual but from the collective as the most significant unit in the discussion. Time and again, even among liberal and libertarian circles, hot topics are posed as any of the following: “Should we do V?”; “Should society allow X?”; “Should the Government intervene in Y”? “Should everyone be forced to do Z?”

Such a way of tackling these problems assumes that there must be an answer that is applicable to everyone. That, for everyone, either one of A or B must apply but individuals (those selfish, unfeeling, heartless and greedy morons whose interests must always be subjugated by the “good of the people”) are never able to choose which one of those they might prefer. Indeed, for libertarians and liberals to accept the false dilemma by entering these discussions results in them conceding the basic assumption of the statist opposition, that is that the individual is subordinate to the collective.

Here are some common examples. Please note that the discussion of each is not intended to resolve the issue at hand, merely to demonstrate the correct way of posing the question.

1. Should we intervene in other countries’ affairs?

Anyone attempting to answer this question is invited to argue, in the face of brutal oppression or of invasions of countries elsewhere, that either everyone must be forced to pay for or participate in “our” intervention or everyone must not. In short, a more honest way of stating the question is “should the Government confiscate the fruits of our productivity (i.e. tax) us to pay for military aggrandizement abroad?”

But why should we all have to intervene or all not have to intervene via the Government? If I believe so strongly that the aggressive violence on the part of state leaders or armies overseas is so unjust and must be repelled then what is stopping me from sending my financial help with money that I have earned to this cause? Indeed, what is stopping me from resigning from my current life and flying out to act as a freedom fighter in defence of the helpless civilians? On the other hand, if I believe that whatever is going on abroad is none of my business or I have (in my view) much greater pre-occupations at home and that my financial resources are best devoted to these why should I be taxed to fund a cause that others find important but I do not? What right does anyone else have to money that I have earned but they have not? Further, actions always speak louder than words. If you believe so strongly in something then you should be able to put your own money where your mouth is. If you are only willing to do so with other people’s money then perhaps it isn’t that much of a just cause after all?

In short, the problem should be discussed as follows. If the individual wants to support a cause abroad should he be prevented from doing so if it inflicts no violence or aggression on any other individual? If he does not wish to support such a cause then should he be forced to do so when his antipathy is similarly free of violence and aggression?

2. Should we allow the buying and selling of organs?

Again, the question is not “should we permit or ban the trade of organs?” It’s “should I be prevented or permitted by you from trading what is a part of my person or property with another individual on terms agreeable to ourselves that inflicts no violence or aggression on anyone else?” Answers on either side must therefore be directed to the question of what justifies one individual or group of individuals being able to violently enforce their point of view on others who do not share this point of view.

3. Should we regulate industry X?

The story is always the same. Something terrible happens, a plane crash, a building falls down, or someone loses their life savings through the collapse of some hair brained investment scheme. The clamour is always for us to regulate more, usually in the name of safety, to prevent such disastrous consequences from ever happening again. In practice what this means is that the Government should be permitted to tax all of us in order to more closely supervise industry X, industry X being whichever industry is deemed to have caused the unfortunate event.

As tempting as it is to launch into a discussion of the fact that regulation itself consumes valuable resources and hence is also a part of the market process, plus that regulations are often the very cause of the problems that they seek to ameliorate (or at least the existing regulations fail to detect problems that should have been obvious within their existing scope – Bernie Madoff for instance), we shall stick to the problem of how these questions should be posed correctly. If I think that industry X should be regulated then why can’t I pay, with my own resources, a consumer watchdog to keep an eye on industry X and report to me any potential problems? Or, as would more likely be the case, why do I not just refuse to purchase products from industry X and insist that, before I return as a paying customer, they must conform to the standards laid out by regulator Y? (Underwriters Laboratories is a good example of this arrangement). Should my desire to see industry X regulated allow me to command the resources of people who wish to have nothing to do with industry X, or are happy to accept its products unregulated at the price for which they are on offer?

4. Should we ban smoking in public places?

The loaded phrase in this question is “public places”, a good definition of which is as follows:

“Generally an indoor or outdoor area, whether privately or publicly owned, to which the public have access by right or by invitation, expressed or implied, whether by payment of money or not, but not a place when used exclusively by one or more individuals for a private gathering or other personal purpose.”

The problem is that most premises that are within the scope of this definition of “public place” in various pieces of legislation are not places that are paid for and maintained by public money (taxes). They are privately owned and operated places to which members of the public usually do not possess a right to enter but rather are invited to do so in order to carry out trade. Shops, bars, restaurants, gyms, etc. are all good examples of this kind of premises that are categorised as a “public place”. No one is forced to enter these places, to purchase products that are sold there or to pay for their upkeep. In short all activity that goes on there is entirely voluntary.

The question, therefore, is not whether “we” should ban smoking in “public places”. It is “should I, as an owner of private premises into which the public are invited, be forced by you and others to allow or prevent my invited visitors from smoking when you have no obligation to enter, pay for or maintain these premises?” Alternatively “why if I prefer or prefer not to smoke when I am an invited visitor to certain premises should I be not able to find premises that suit my desire accordingly when you need not enter, pay for or maintain these premises?”

In conclusion, the common element running through all of these questions is the absence of violence and aggression involved in the acts concerned. In short all of the questions can be posed as “Should X prevent Y from doing activity Z when Y carrying out activity Z inflicts no violence or aggression on X?” Posing the questions in this way strips naked all collective thinking and exposes it for what it really is: the violent enforcement of the values, tastes and morals of some people upon people who do not share the same.

Finally, the words of Ludwig von Mises in these regards are instructive:

Individual man is born into a socially organized environment. In this sense alone we may accept the saying that society is-logically or historically-antecedent to the individual. In every other sense this dictum is either empty or nonsensical. The individual lives and acts within society. But society is nothing but the combination of individuals for cooperative effort. It exists nowhere else than in the actions of individual men. It is a delusion to search for it outside the actions of individuals. To speak of a society’s autonomous and independent existence, of its life, its soul, and its actions is a metaphor which can easily lead to crass errors.

The questions whether society or the individual is to be considered as the uitimate end, and whether the interests of society should be subordinated to those of the individuals or the interests of the individuals to those of society are fruitless. Action is always action of individual men. The social or societal element is a certain orientation of the actions of individual men. The category end makes sense only when applied to action. Theology and the metaphysics of history may discuss the ends of society and the designs which God wants to realize with regard to society in the same way in which they discuss the purpose of all other parts of the created universe. For science, which is inseparable from reason, a tool manifestly unfit for the treatment of such problems, it would be hopeless to embark upon speculations concerning these matters. (Human Action, Scholars Edition, p. 143)

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